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RECONSIDERING ESTOPPEL: PATENT ADMINISTRATION AND
THE FAILURE OF FESTO
†

R. POLK WAGNER

Last Term, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
the United States Supreme Court missed perhaps the most important opportunity
for patent law reform in two decades. At the core of the failure to grasp the implications of “prosecution history estoppel”—a judicially crafted principle limiting
the enforceable scope of patents based on acts occurring during their application
process—is the heretofore universal (but ultimately unsupportable) view of the doctrine as an arbitrary ex post limitation on patent scope. This Article demonstrates
the serious flaws in this traditionalist approach, and develops a new theory of
prosecution history estoppel based on its ex ante effects. This shift of focus from the
allocation of liability during infringement (ex post) to the way the rule generates
incentives both during and before inventors apply for patents (ex ante) offers substantial insights into the central role that this venerable doctrine plays in the modern patent administrative system. In particular, the Article argues that prosecution history estoppel is best viewed as an information-forcing default penalty rule,
where the possibility of lost patent scope induces patentees to produce socially valuable information early in the life of the patent. Other benefits include the internalization of costs related to certain activities during patent prosecution, and increased enforcement of the institutional arrangements between the Patent Office
and the judiciary. Indeed, the considerable analytic advantages observed in this
context strongly suggest that the Article’s methodological approach of reconsidering
the patent law in an explicitly ex ante framework has applications well beyond
prosecution history estoppel.
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INTRODUCTION
Last Term, the United States Supreme Court considered perhaps
1
the most important issue of patent law reform in two decades. In
2
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo VII”), the
Court opined upon the venerable and seemingly obscure doctrine of
“prosecution history estoppel,” a judicially crafted rule that limits the
enforceable scope of patents based upon activities during their appli3
cation process (their “prosecution,” in patent parlance). Yet the important tale here is not the Court’s foray into “this most metaphysical
4
branch of modern law,” nor even the wisdom of the decision on its
own terms. The significance of Festo is that—despite the enormous
implications of the decision for our modern system of patent administration—the opportunity for meaningful reform of the patent prosecution process went unrecognized and unmentioned, swept aside by a
narrow, statist, and ultimately illogical approach to the central issue
involved. Indeed, the failure of the Court to even seriously consider
the real (as opposed to the illusory) implications of the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel is all the more ironic in an era when the
patent administration system is increasingly under fire for the very
5
problems that Festo could have addressed.
1

In 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created
and vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent
laws. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (creating the Federal Circuit);
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000) (defining the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit).
2
122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002).
3
Id. at 1835.
4
Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437, 485 (1848) (describing the patent law).
Judge Giles Rich also famously described the patent law as “the metaphysics of law”
during congressional hearings concerning the 1952 Patent Act. Patent Law Codification
and Revision 1951: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong. 153 (1951).
5
Much of the recent criticism relates to the failures of the patent system to adequately evaluate inventions. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE
FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 205-15 (2001) (questioning the patent system’s treatment of patents affecting cyberspace); Robert P. Merges, As Many as
Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 606-15 (1999) (“A recurring theme in the assessment of PTO performance is poor examination quality . . . .”); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 305, 316-22 (stating that examiners are prone to issue invalid patents because of
insufficient samples of prior art); Simson L. Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, WIRED, July
1994, at 104 (criticizing the Patent Office’s approach to software patents); James
Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44, 47 (reporting that “the
patent office has neither the time nor the expertise needed to distinguish good patents

162

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 151: 159

The frustration of this most recent effort to clarify and stabilize
6
the administration of the patent system stems from the (remarkable)
fact that neither the courts nor the commentators, to date, have recognized the incompleteness of the contemporary view of prosecution
history estoppel and the deficient theoretical cul-de-sac into which the
current debate leads. That is, the conventional—and apparently universal—approach to the issue is directed to the purported interplay
between prosecution history estoppel and the “doctrine of equiva7
lents” (another judicially created canon, allowing infringement to be
8
found on the basis of an “equivalent” of a patented invention). As
from bad”); Jeff Bezos, An Open Letter from Jeff Bezos on the Subject of Patents (proposing
changes to the way that patent law addresses business method and software patents), at
http://www.oreilly.com/news/amazon_patents.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2002); Legal
Resources for Surviving the Patenting Frenzy of the Internet, Bioinformatics and Electronic Commerce (arguing that “strained conditions” in the form of scarce time and resources keep
patent examiners from sufficiently evaluating applications leading to the issuance of
bad patents), at http://www.bustpatents.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2002).
6
The Federal Circuit’s majority opinion in Festo was premised on its view that two
decades of experience with prosecution history estoppel had brought into focus the
uncertainty and confusion surrounding its application. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo VI ”), 234 F.3d 558, 574-75 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (“[A]fter nearly twenty years in performing our role as the sole court of appeals
for patent matters . . . the notice function of patent claims has become paramount,
and the need for certainty as to the scope of patent protection has been emphasized.”), rev’d, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002).
7
On the doctrine of equivalents, see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (“Under this doctrine, a product or process that does not
literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to
infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.”); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950) (describing what constitutes equivalency).
8
Regarding the conventionally understood relationship between prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents, it would be an understatement to say
that the standard view of prosecution history estoppel considers the rule as nothing
more (and nothing less) than a limitation on the doctrine of equivalents. Indeed,
such a view appears to be universal among courts and commentators alike. See, e.g.,
Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1839 (describing prosecution history estoppel as integral to the
analysis of the doctrine of equivalents); Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 562-63 (describing the issue in Festo as “relating to the doctrine of equivalents”); Matthew J. Conigliaro et al.,
Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045, 1047 (2001) (describing
prosecution history estoppel as intended to limit the scope of the doctrine of equivalents); Ronald D. Hantman, Prosecution History Estoppel, Part I, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 121 (1991) (describing prosecution history estoppel as a means of determining patent scope); Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents for the Twenty-First Century:
Maximize Patent Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a Post-Markman/Hilton
Davis World, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 499, 501-02 (1997) (“[T]he most critical portion of Hilton Davis is its treatment of prosecution history estoppel as a limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.”); Jeremy E. Noe, Paradise Lost but Recaptured:
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such, contemporary analyses of prosecution history estoppel have become hopelessly entangled with the policy bases underlying the doc9
trine of equivalents, rather than addressing estoppel on its own terms.
This “equivalents-centered” approach to prosecution history estoppel—which considers the rule through the monochromatic lens of
patent scope—views the debates over the doctrine as simply a manifestation of an ongoing ideological struggle over the contours of optimal
10
patent protection.

Prosecution History Estoppel Weakened in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical
Co., 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 2 (1998) (“Congress ideally should codify the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, strictly viewing that doctrine’s operation as an absolute bar on
expansion of claim limits.”); John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV.
183, 191 (1999) (acknowledging a fundamental role of prosecution history as preventing “a patentee from seeking expansive claim coverage under the Doctrine of Equivalents”); Paul J. Otterstedt, Note, Unwrapping File Wrapper Estoppel in the Federal Circuit: A
New Economic Policy Approach, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 405, 406 (1993) (“[Prosecution history estoppel] forbids an inventor from recapturing, through the doctrine of equivalents, claims that were surrendered during the prosecution process . . . .”).
9
See, e.g., Festo VI, at 575-78 (arguing that a strong form of prosecution history estoppel is beneficial by limiting the scope of equivalents, providing notice and certainty); id. at 620-21 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he majority unfairly tips the balance away from patentees and toward competitors by
constraining the legitimate rights of patentees to their inventions . . . .”); id. at 641-42
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The doctrine of equivalents
has not been deemed superfluous as an instrument [of] justice, and not until today has
it been deemed ‘unworkable’ by this court. The Federal Circuit’s sua sponte change in
this law is a change in industrial policy that requires public discussion in advance of,
not after, the law has been changed.”).
10
For example, in their recent analysis of prosecution history estoppel, Conigliaro, Greenberg, and Lemley frame the issue as one requiring the balancing of the
competing policy goals of (a) adequately protecting the patentee-inventor and (b)
clearly notifying the public about the scope of protection:
In the context of the doctrine of equivalents, the law best promotes progress
by the careful balancing of dynamic protection for the patentee and clear notice to the public of what products will infringe the patent. Each of these patent functions is fundamental, and it is only by their harmonious interplay that
patent law can encourage both technological improvements and pioneering
inventions.
Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1056.
In the larger debate about patent scope, those suggesting broad protection assert
that patentees will then be better able (and more strongly encouraged) to coordinate
technological development. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-12 (2001) (arguing that the patent system promotes technological progress through commercialization when technological economic factors would not achieve the same end); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265 (1977); see also JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106 (1st ed. 1942).
Those arguing for more limited scope respond that competition, rather than co-
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This Article takes issue with the traditional, equivalents-centered
view of prosecution history estoppel, reconceptualizing the doctrine
within the framework of incentives and strategic choices involved in
the modern patent administration system. Indeed, I contend that
prosecution history estoppel cannot be viewed solely in terms of the
doctrine of equivalents. The relationship between the two doctrines is
entirely instrumental; that prosecution history estoppel implicates
patent scope is not the end of the analysis, but the beginning. For it is
this effect on patent scope (and thus the underlying value of the patent grant) that supports a broader, incentives-oriented role for the
canon. Accordingly, this Article offers a theory of prosecution history
estoppel as significant to the central goal of the patent administration
system: producing information related to the crucial relationship be11
tween innovation, disclosure, and patent scope.
This theory is supported by two insights into the functional characteristics of the doctrine. The first is that prosecution history information generated prior to and during the prosecution of the patent is
enormously important to the system of patent administration. A major concern in the modern patent system is uncertainty surrounding
the ultimate coverage of a patent; that is, the relationship between invention, disclosure, and patent scope that is at the core of the social
12
compact of the patent system.
Ambiguity in this context makes
evaluating patentability difficult, undermines financial valuations, re-

ordination, is likely to yield better technical progress. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1017, 1072-73 (1989) (arguing that broad patent scope can have inefficient effects with
respect to technological improvements); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048-72 (1997) (describing a model for
the patent system that entitles an improver to a patent so long as the improvement is
significant, even if it falls within the range of the original patent); Robert P. Merges,
Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62
TENN. L. REV. 75, 75-76 (1994) (discussing the “reverse doctrine of equivalents” as encouraging the voluntary licensing of patents for research towards their improvement);
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843-44 (1990) (“[T]he law should attempt at the margins to favor
a competitive environment for improvements . . . . In many industries the efficiency
gains from the pioneer’s ability to coordinate are likely to be outweighed by the loss of
competition for improvements to the basic invention.”).
11
See infra Parts II-III (expanding this argument).
12
See generally Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2661 (1994) (“Although the overall goal of intellectual property
law is often described in allocational efficiency terms (i.e., to increase economic output
by overcoming market failures associated with the public goods quality of creative
works), there is often an undercurrent of concern with the distribution of resources.”);
sources cited supra note 5 (criticizing the patent system’s evaluation of patentability).
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sults in confusion concerning potential infringement, and requires
13
costly ex post generation of information, often as part of litigation.
This is, above all, an informational problem—of timing, quality, and
quantity. Importantly, the contemporaneous, patentee-provided information related to prosecution history (and induced by estoppel, as
noted below) is likely to be the best possible source of information,
and thus reveals the doctrine as critical to the informational challenges at the heart of the patent system.
The second insight supporting a reevaluation of prosecution history estoppel is that the potential for lost patent scope coverage (as a
14
result of the application of prosecution history estoppel) generates
incentives for the patentee to act in socially beneficial ways, such as:
15
developing and disclosing additional information; seeking an appro16
priate amount of coverage, given the invention’s significance; and
enhancing the importance of the role of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), thus maintaining the institutional ar17
rangements established by the patent system itself. The dual roles
for prosecution history estoppel—providing information and creating
incentives—directly support the patent administration system’s goal of
13

See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence-Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J.
759, 785-88 (1999) (noting the virtues of certainty in patent law); see also Festo VII, 122
S. Ct. at 1837 (noting the costs of uncertainty); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An
Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1585, 1647-51 (1998) (“[T]he calculation of profits attributable to an infringement
often will be a difficult task and very likely will involve some uncertainty in the estimation process.”); Robert P. Merges, supra note 12, at 2656-65 (discussing how difficulties
of valuation and detection of externalities in the invention context lead to high transaction costs in the exchange of intellectual property rights).
14
See, e.g., Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1838 (noting the scope-reducing effects of estoppel).
15
In this sense, prosecution history estoppel might be seen as a form of an information-forcing default penalty rule. See infra Part III.A (describing the informationforcing role of prosecution history estoppel); see also, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,
91-95 (1989) (introducing the concept of “penalty defaults” designed to provide an
incentive to at least one party of a contract to force affirmative terms that modify a default rule).
16
“Overclaiming”—the seeking of too-broad coverage given the significance of an
invention—generates significant social costs. As discussed, infra Part III.B, a robust
version of prosecution history estoppel, by raising the costs of overclaiming, encourages the patentee to claim appropriately at the outset.
17
Prosecution history estoppel “raises the stakes” of decisions made by the PTO,
and thus encourages patentees to seriously assist the PTO in reaching correct decisions, and vigorously advocate (perhaps via an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit) for their interests. See infra Part III.C (discussing how prosecution
history estoppel can be viewed as a way to enforce the role of the PTO).
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maintaining the relationship between innovation, disclosure, and patent scope. A robust theory of prosecution history estoppel, then, offers a significant contribution to the understanding and analysis of the
modern patent system.
The theory of prosecution history developed by this Article greatly
informs the continuing debate—recently illustrated by the series of
18
19
Festo opinions —concerning the specific form of the rule. Only a
strong form of prosecution history estoppel—one that clearly reduces
the potential scope of a patent when triggered—adequately supports
the information-production and incentive-creation roles of the doctrine; weaker forms, including the Supreme Court’s “presumptive
20
bar” or the “foreseeable bar” rule offered as an intermediate posi21
22
tion, fall well short of these goals. And yet the traditional analyses
18

The tortured path of the patent dispute between the Festo Corporation and
SMC (as the defendant does business in the U.S.) is something of a metaphor for the
debates surrounding prosecution history estoppel in recent years. In 1994, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of Festo Corporation on
the basis of both summary judgments and jury verdicts of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, finding no prosecution history estoppel. See Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo I Judgment”), No. 88-1814-PBS, slip op.
at 2-3 (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 1994) (entering a jury verdict of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo I
Order ”), No. 88-1814-PBS, slip op. at 14-15 (D. Mass. July 11, 1994) (granting summary
judgment of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
The District Court was initially affirmed by the Federal Circuit, Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo II ”), 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995), but
that decision was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in light of the discussion of prosecution history estoppel in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,
520 U.S. 17 (1997). Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp. (“Festo III ”),
520 U.S. 1111 (1997).
Upon remand, a panel of the Federal Circuit again affirmed Festo I, declining to
apply prosecution history estoppel. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo IV ”), 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that prosecution history
estoppel does not necessarily bar all equivalents). The Federal Circuit then granted a
petition for rehearing en banc, vacating Festo IV and ordering new briefing directed to
specific aspects of prosecution history estoppel. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo V ” ), 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc). The en banc
majority opinion reversed the Festo I decisions on the basis of prosecution history estoppel, see Festo VI, 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (reversing Festo I on
grounds that prosecution history estoppel prohibited infringement based on the doctrine of equivalents), and was subsequently vacated and remanded by the Supreme
Court. See Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (defining circumstances where prosecution
history estoppel will limit the application of equivalents).
19
See infra Part IV (describing the various potential forms of the estoppel rule).
20
See Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1842 (“[W]e hold here that the patentee should bear
the burden of showing that the amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question.”).
21
See Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1048 (suggesting a “foreseeable bar” that
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of the doctrine, by failing to consider prosecution history estoppel in
its broader role, have missed the opportunity to achieve the significant
patent law reforms that this rule provides.
Finally, the Article’s theoretical relocation of the classic doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel within the system of incentives and
strategic choices that drive patent administration is significant in an
illustrative sense as well. The basic insight here—the benefits that
flow from shifting the analytic focus from the doctrine as an ex post
(after the patent issues) attempt to cabin patent scope to an instrumental tool with important ex ante effects—is generalizable. That is,
features of the patent administration system make many of the doctrines particularly amenable to a similar form of exegesis, where a legal rule is evaluated by its impact on ex ante incentives rather than
solely on the basis of ex post factors. Accordingly, the analysis here
might be seen as a template, suggesting further avenues of inquiry
across the patent law.
* * *
This Article moves in five parts. In Part I below, I introduce
prosecution history estoppel, in particular exploring the incompleteness of the current equivalents-centered view. Here I note that contrary to common understanding, the information generated via the
prosecution history process is widely used throughout the patent law,
casting doubt on the narrow view of prosecution history estoppel as
merely a limitation on patent scope. Further, the historical development of prosecution history estoppel does not support this equivaeliminates equivalents only to the extent that such a limitation of scope was foreseeable
at the time amendment(s) were made).
22
Many readers will observe that the en banc majority of the Federal Circuit implemented a form of prosecution history estoppel like that advocated here. See, e.g.,
Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 564 (“[W]e hold that when a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, no range of equivalents is available for the amended claim element.”). And yet the opinion by which the court explained its decision is based almost
entirely upon an equivalents-centered view of prosecution history estoppel. See Festo VI,
234 F.3d at 575-78 (explaining that a strong form of prosecution history estoppel has
the beneficial effects of limiting the scope of equivalents, providing notice and establishing certainty). Indeed, all of the major Festo VI opinions are equivalents-centered.
See id. at 620-21 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he majority
unfairly tips the balance away from patentees and toward competitors by constraining
the legitimate rights of patentees to their inventions . . . .”); id. at 641-42 (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The doctrine of equivalents has not been
deemed superfluous as an instrument [of] justice, and not until today has it been
deemed ‘unworkable’ by this court.”).
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lents-centered view, as the rule is rooted in the concept of patent disclaimers rather than being associated with the doctrine of equivalents.
And finally, I note that the logical bases of many of the objections to
the strong form of prosecution history estoppel (as seen in the Supreme Court’s Festo VII opinion) are unsatisfactory and based on fundamental misunderstandings of the real effect and nature of prosecution history estoppel.
In Part II, I begin to address the failures of the equivalentscentered view, noting the role of prosecution history in providing information crucial to the administration of the patent system. In doing
so, I first trace the outlines of a model of patent administration, using
both doctrine and theory to describe the central goal as maintaining
the link between a proffered innovation, the disclosure provided by
the patent document, and the scope of the patent grant. I note that
underlying patent policy establishes the nature of this link; the task of
the patent administration system is to maintain it. Doing so, I observe,
involves acquiring deeply contextual information—of the sort that
prosecution history (or, indeed, pre-prosecution information) is especially likely to provide. Thus, prosecution history information, being
contemporaneous, patentee-provided, and especially relevant, plays a
significant role in the administration of the patent system.
A second and perhaps even more important role for prosecution
history estoppel is suggested in Part III: the creation of incentives.
Building from the law and economics literature of default rules, I first
argue that prosecution history estoppel is best viewed as an information-forcing penalty default rule. That is, the fact that the application
of prosecution history estoppel can limit patent scope creates incentives for prospective patentees to avoid such a penalty by adjusting
their behavior. These adjustments all result in the production of additional information—for example, conducting thorough prior art
searches, claiming appropriately in light of the prior art, and limiting
original claims to that supported by the disclosure—thus supporting
the informational needs of the patent administration system identified
in Part II. Relatedly, I identify a heretofore unremarked externality in
the patent prosecution process: the shift in costs of information failures from prospective patentees to the public (usually in the form of
the PTO). A robust version of prosecution history estoppel can address the prosecution externality by at least forcing patentees to consider the costs of information production during prosecution. Finally,
I note that the meaningful application of prosecution history estoppel
creates incentives for private parties to enforce the institutional ar-
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rangements in the patent law—especially that between the PTO and
the federal judiciary.
Part IV applies this theory of prosecution history estoppel to the
debate relating to the specific form of estoppel. I argue that a strong
form of estoppel—one that significantly limits the scope of the patent—dominates the so-called “flexible” versions. First, I note the
strong form of estoppel, and its information-production and incentive-creation characteristics, works a significant reform to the patent
law, neatly addressing many current criticisms of the patent system.
Second, the choice between strong and flexible versions of estoppel is
a debate about rules versus standards. The extensive literature concerning this debate, I argue, counsels in favor of a rule in this context.
A clear rule will increase the learning effect of the legal regime (and
thus increase compliance with the information-forcing aspects of estoppel). Further, a rule offers the patentee, in particular, the opportunity to meaningfully consider the costs and benefits of avoiding the
penalty of estoppel. And third, I observe that the only actual empirical evidence about the success or failure of prosecution history estoppel rules comes from the Federal Circuit itself, the single organization
with the most experience in applying estoppel. That the Federal Circuit determined that the flexible rules were unworkable, I suggest, is
deeply significant.
Part V concludes the article by suggesting that although the recent
Festo decisions best represent the failure of courts and commentators
to fully address the importance of prosecution history estoppel to the
patent administration system, there are potential avenues to pursue.
In particular, I note that the Supreme Court’s “presumptive” form of
prosecution history estoppel, while far from ideal, offers the Federal
Circuit a range within which to apply the doctrine. The Federal Circuit should take advantage of this flexibility to vigorously apply prosecution history estoppel, seeking to achieve at least some of the benefits of the rule noted above. Finally, the significance of the analytic
shift from ex post (after issue) to ex ante (before issue) is discussed,
and further avenues of research suggested.
I. THE INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF PROSECUTION HISTORY
ESTOPPEL
The “prosecution history” or “file wrapper” of an issued patent is
the official record of proceedings in the United States Patent and
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Trademark Office (PTO) related to the activities that prompted the
23
issuance (or grant) of the patent. As should be easily apparent, a
patent’s prosecution history will often contain amendments, clarifications, representations, and perhaps arguments by the inventor (or her
24
representative) intended to persuade the PTO to grant the patent.
Thus, the typical doctrinal statement of prosecution history estoppel
explains that it seeks to prevent the patentee from recovering any sub25
ject matter that was surrendered during prosecution. Paradigmatically, if a patentee amends her claim during prosecution—say by
changing a “three-legged stool” to “a three-legged stool with a sloped
backrest,” perhaps to avoid prior art—then prosecution history estoppel will operate to prevent the patentee from asserting coverage over
26
simple three-legged stools. Similarly, if our patentee was to argue to
23

See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cynamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“[T]he prosecution history . . . of the patent consists of the entire record of
proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office.”); PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 719 (7th ed.
1998) (“The folder in which the [PTO] maintains the application papers is referred to
as the [prosecution history].”). Professor Donald Chisum reports that the traditional
term of reference was “file wrapper estoppel,” but that around 1983, the Federal Circuit “re-christened” the doctrine prosecution history estoppel. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND
INFRINGEMENT § 18.05 (2002). For simplicity, the terms “prosecution history” and
“prosecution history estoppel” will be used hereafter.
24
[The prosecution history] includes all express representations made by or
on behalf of the applicant to the examiner to induce a patent grant . . . . Such
representations include amendments to the claims and arguments made to
convince the examiner that the claimed invention meets the statutory requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.
Standard Oil Co., 774 F.2d at 452.
25
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33, 40-41
(1997) (explaining that prosecution history is intended to limit the scope of equivalents); Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 564-65 (“The logic of prosecution history estoppel is that
the patentee, during prosecution, has created a record that fairly notifies the public
that the patentee has surrendered the right to claim particular matter as within the
reach of the patent.”); Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Prosecution history estoppel precludes a patentee from obtaining under the doctrine of equivalents coverage of subject matter that has been relinquished during the process of its patent application.”); Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus.,
Inc. 126 F.3d 1420, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (likening a patentee’s attempt to recover the
coverage of a patent surrendered to an attempt to “retrade or renege on a deal struck
with the PTO”); Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that prosecution history estoppel “prevents the doctrine
of equivalents from clashing with claim significance”); Autogiro Co. v. United States,
384 F.2d 391, 400 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“The doctrine of equivalents is subservient to [prosecution history estoppel].”).
26
This is an example of what might be called “estoppel by amendment.” See, e.g.,
Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Eng’g Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 48 (1935) (“[W]here . . .
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the examiner that her “three-legged stool” did not cover those made
of stainless steel, then prosecution history estoppel would typically operate to prevent the later assertion of infringement against stainless
27
steel stools.
Binding a patentee to her prosecution record, the argument goes,
enhances and supports the “notice function” of the patent docu28
ment, preventing the public from being misled regarding the true
29
nature and scope of the patent.
During the past several decades, the application of prosecution
30
history estoppel has become unsettled. The doctrine itself has been
broad claims are denied and narrower substituted, the patentee is estopped to read the
granted claim as the equivalent of those which were rejected.”); see also 5A CHISUM,
supra note 23, § 18.05[2][a] (listing relevant cases).
27
This might be called estoppel by argument. See, e.g., Litton Sys. Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]n applicant’s arguments may constitute a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter. Such arguments preclude recapture of that subject matter.” (citation omitted)); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“The estoppel may arise . . . as a
result of argument to secure allowance of a claim.”). Professor Chisum notes that this
form of estoppel is relatively uncertain and largely confined to the Federal Circuit. 5A
CHISUM, supra note 23, § 18.05[2][c]. However, given that the Federal Circuit explicitly approved this form of estoppel sitting en banc in Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1460, and
is the sole appellate court for patent appeals, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000) (defining
the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit), these concerns seem unfounded in the modern era.
28
See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33 (noting “the role of claims in defining an
invention and providing public notice”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (requiring a
patent to contain claims that “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention”).
29
See, e.g., Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 564-65 (identifying one of the two principle functions of prosecution history estoppel as “preserving the notice function of claims”);
Charles Greiner & Co., 962 F.2d at 1036 (acknowledging that prosecution history estoppel “promotes certainty and clarity in determining the scope of patent rights”); see also
5A CHISUM, supra note 23, § 18.05[1] (citing public notice as a rationale for prosecution history estoppel).
30
See, e.g., Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 565-91 (describing and characterizing the unsettled
nature of the law); Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1048 (evaluating as unworkable
the approach of both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court with regard to prosecution history estoppel in Festo); Hantman, supra note 8, at 122 (“What remains of the
doctrine is so vague that its effect on the interpretation and scope of claims cannot be
determined until after a district court passes on the issue.”); Mueller, supra note 8, at
501-02 (concluding that the Supreme Court is “less than crystal clear” about the
proper application and scope of prosecution history estoppel); Noe, supra note 8, at
11-12 (“Judicial concern continues regarding the doctrine’s potential to expand claims
as well as its erosion of the notice function of claims.” (footnotes omitted)); Thomas,
supra note 8, at 187 (setting out “to solve the puzzle of prosecution history”); Otterstedt, supra note 8, at 410-16 (addressing a perceived divide in the Federal Circuit between a flexible and strict bar on the doctrine of equivalents based on prosecution history); Note, To Bar or Not to Bar: Prosecution History Estoppel After Warner-Jenkinson, 111
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31

virtually unquestioned, though its application along several dimensions has become inconsistent. Indeed, in an extraordinary step in
the Festo case, the Federal Circuit outlined four distinct areas of confu32
sion in the doctrine that it wished the parties (and amici) to consider
33
and later decided each question en banc.
This unraveling of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel
might be explained as simply a function of the complexity of the re34
quired analysis: a process that requires the court to analyze whether
the patentee discussed or amended the key element or elements of
the patent, whether that discussion constituted a surrender of relevant
subject matter, and whether the relinquishment has a bearing on the
35
infringement issue at hand. To be sure, that must be part of the
equation. But an even more apt story can be told here: The confuHarv. L. Rev. 2330, 2330-31 (1998) (considering the inconsistent manner in which the
prosecution history is applied).
31
Cf. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30 (describing the continuing vitality of prosecution history estoppel). Note that none of the commentary cited supra note 30 advocates the elimination of the doctrine.
32
See Festo V, 187 F.3d 1381, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (ordering the
submission of briefs directed at prosecution history estoppel in light of WarnerJenkinson). The four areas identified by the Federal Circuit were: (1) whether an applicant’s argument relating to other-than-prior-art issues was relevant for prosecution
history estoppel; (2) whether a “voluntary” amendment or argument (i.e., one unprompted by examiner action) could trigger estoppel; (3) the scope of the doctrine of
equivalents remaining (if any) if estoppel applies to a claim element; and (4) the scope
of the doctrine of equivalents remaining (if any) in the event that the applicant cannot
establish a reason for the amendment. Id. The court also ordered briefing on a fifth
question, relating to the “all-elements-rule” and its applicability to the case at hand. Id.
The fifth question did not implicate prosecution history estoppel and was not answered by the court. See Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 587 (“[W]e do not reach the ‘all elements’ rule.”).
33
The Federal Circuit answered the “four questions” in the following way: (1) any
amendment or argument relating to the patentability of an invention is relevant for
estoppel; (2) voluntary amendments can and do trigger estoppel; (3) if estoppel applies, the scope of the equivalents is zero; and (4) if no reason for an amendment or
argument is established, the scope of the equivalents is zero. Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 56587.
34
Prosecution history estoppel is considered an issue of law. See, e.g., WarnerJenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (explaining that such limitations on the application of the
doctrine of equivalents are judgments to be rendered by the court as a matter of law).
35
And after Festo VII, the court must also determine whether the amendment to
the claims “can[] reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent.” 122 S.
Ct. at 1842; cf. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 31-33 (“Our prior case law consistently applied prosecution history estoppel only when claims have been amended for a limited
set of reasons . . . .”). But see Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 564-65 (“[W]e hold that ‘unexplained’ amendments are not entitled to any range of equivalents.”). For a discussion
of the complexity in determinining the applicability of the doctrine, see 5A CHISUM,
supra note 23, § 18.05[2]-[3]; Note, supra note 30, at 2331-32 (same).
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sion and uncertainty in prosecution history estoppel is an unfortunate
byproduct of the rule’s direct association (in the traditional view) with
the “doctrine of equivalents,” a judicially crafted scheme that allows
patentees to expand the scope of the patent grant to cover “equiva36
lents” to the claimed invention. Through its entanglement with the

36

The classic justification for the doctrine of equivalents is found in Graver Tank
& Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950):
[C]ourts have also recognized that to permit imitation of a patented invention
which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of
the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation would
leave room for—indeed encourage—the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which,
though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside
the claim, and hence outside the reach of law. One who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or play, may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy. Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement.
To prohibit no other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and
would be subordinating substance to form. It would deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would foster concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of the patent system.
The doctrine of equivalents evolved in response to this experience. The
essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud on a patent . . . .
“To temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit
of an invention” a patentee may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the
producer of a device “if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.”
Id. at 607-08 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
As might be imagined, there have been dissenters throughout–-as exemplified by
Judge Learned Hand, writing in 1929:
It is plain that [the doctrine of equivalents] violates in theory the underlying
and necessary principle that the disclosure is open to the public save as the
claim forbids, and that it is the claim and that alone which measures the monopoly . . . . On the one hand, therefore, the claim is not to be taken at its
face—however freely construed—but its elements may be treated as examples
of a class which may be extended more or less broadly as the disclosure warrants, the prior art permits, and the originality of the discovery makes desirable. On the other, it is not to be ignored as a guide in ascertaining those
elements of the disclosure which constitute the “invention,” and without
which there could be no patent at all. It is obviously impossible to set any
theoretic limits to such a doctrine, which indeed its origin forbids, since it is
in misericordiam to relieve those who have failed to express their complete
meaning. Somewhat the same process is indeed inherent in the interpretation of any verbal expression, and perhaps the best that can be said is that in
the case of patent claims much greater liberties are taken than would be allowed elsewhere. Each case is inevitably a matter of degree, as so often happens, and other decisions have little or no value. The usual ritual, which is so
often repeated and which has so little meaning, that the same result must follow by substantially the same means, does not help much in application; it is
no more than a way of stating the problem. Any decision is therefore bound
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doctrine of equivalents, the conventional view of prosecution history
estoppel has lost sight of any independent role that estoppel might
play in the wider patent administration system. Further, by association
with the doctrine of equivalents, prosecution history estoppel has become “caught up” in a variety of jurisprudential debates and controversies in which the proper function of estoppel has been considered
37
out of context, if at all. For example, in the recent jurisprudential
debates in the Festo series of decisions, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel was universally invoked as a limit on the breadth of the
doctrine of equivalents—rather than as a important component in the
38
patent administration system. Similarly, the academic commentary
to have an arbitrary color, as in all close cases of interpretation, and it is difficult to give it greater authority than an appeal to the sympathetic understanding of an impartial reader.
Claude Neon Lights v. E. Machlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574, 575-76 (2d Cir. 1929) (citations
omitted). Even the recent Supreme Court—while affirming the continued existence
and vitality of the doctrine prior to Festo VII—expressed “concern . . . that the doctrine
of equivalents . . . has taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims.
There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.” Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28-29.
37
As I note in the Introduction, supra, the Festo decisions (and arguments) are a
case study in this failure to address the role of prosecution history estoppel.
38
See Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1839 (“Prosecution history estoppel ensures that the
doctrine of equivalents remains tied to its underlying purpose.”); Festo VI, 234 F.3d at
558 (“Prosecution history estoppel is one tool that prevents the doctrine of equivalents
from vitiating the notice function of claims.”); id. at 592 (Plager, J., concurring) (describing estoppel as a limit on the doctrine of equivalents); id. at 600 (Michel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same); id. at 620-22 (Linn, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (same); id. at 630 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
Note that all of the thirty-one briefs filed with the Supreme Court in the Festo
case described prosecution history estoppel as nothing more than a way of limiting the
doctrine of equivalents. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Festo VII (No. 00-1543)
(“[P]rosecution history estoppel prevents a patentee from deliberately relinquishing
subject matter by amending his application in order to obtain a patent and later invoking the doctrine of equivalents to reclaim the surrendered subject matter.”), available
at 2001 WL 1548695; Brief of Amici Curiae IBM Corp. et al. at 6-7 (arguing that the
flexible approach of prosecution history estoppel is flawed because it leaves the scope
of the patent uncertain), available at 2001 WL 1397747; Brief of Amici Curiae Applera
Corp. et al. at 6-8 (describing the purpose of prosecution history estoppel as establishing an accurate measure of what the applicant surrendered in the patent application
process), available at 2001 WL 1548692; Brief of Amici Curiae Intel Corp. et al. at 3-5
(framing prosecution history estoppel as functioning with twin aims: “[T]o promote
efficiency and innovation by increasing the clarity and predictability of patents’ scope,
and to promote fairness by binding patentees to concessions they make before the
PTO.”), available at 2001 WL 1576083; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual
Property Law Association at 2 (considering prosecution history estoppel in terms of its
“effect on the corresponding application of the doctrine of equivalents”), available at
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2001 WL 1025096; Brief of Amicus Curiae Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section of
the Bar Association of the District of Columbia at 2 (“[C]larification of the scope and
extent of [prosecution history estoppel] will help the resolution of all doctrine of
equivalents cases . . . .”), available at 2001 WL 1025555; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association at 2-4 (criticizing a complete bar rule as “all but abolish[ing] the
doctrine of equivalents”), available at 2001 WL 1024048; Brief of Amicus Curiae Celltech Group PLC at 2-4 (highlighting how a complete bar rule in the biotechnology
context allows copyists to avoid liability by cutting off the doctrine of equivalents from
application to insignificant changes), available at 2001 WL 1025107; Brief of Amicus
Curiae United States at 9 (“[P]rosecution history estoppel remains an important limitation on the role of [the doctrine of equivalents].”), available at 2001 WL 1025650;
Brief of Amicus Curiae Chiron Corp. at 2-5 (describing how Festo VI threatens the protection of biotechnology patents secured through the doctrine of equivalents), available at 2001 WL 1025109; Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. at 6-7 (arguing that a complete bar denies protection under the doctrine of
equivalents based on the qualitative value of the patent which the courts historically
have considered), available at 2001 WL 1056915; Brief of Amicus Curiae National Intellectual Property Law Institute at 1-2 (calling the estoppel doctrine forwarded by the
Federal Circuit in Festo VI a “radical departure” undermining valid property rights of
patent holders through equivalencies), available at 2001 WL 1025514; Brief of Amicus
Curiae Consumer Project on Technology at 2-3 (describing the function of prosecution history estoppel as “prevent[ing] resort to the ‘doctrine of equivalents’ to reclaim
any subject matter disclaimed by the amendment”), available at 2001 WL 1397746;
Brief of Amicus Curiae Genentech, Inc. at 2-3 (calling Festo VI a movement towards
“clarity and legal certainty” with respect to the doctrine of equivalents), available at
2001 WL 1480572; Brief of Amicus Curiae MedImmune, Inc. at 2-3 (criticizing the
amicus brief of Celltech), available at 2001 WL 1548693; Brief of Amicus Curiae Litton
Systems, Inc. at 8 (arguing that Festo VI divested patent holders of property rights secured by the doctrine of equivalents), available at 2001 WL 1002689; Brief of Amicus
Curiae Houston Intellectual Property Law Association at 14-15 (“[T]he doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel acts as a check on the reach of the doctrine of equivalents . . . .”), available at 2001 WL 1025169; Brief of Amicus Curiae Philadelphia Intellectual Property Law Association at 2 (claiming that the “full scope of the invention”
cannot be protected under the limited range of equivalents established by Festo VI),
available at 2001 WL 1025603; Brief of Amicus Curiae ASTA Medica Aktiengesellschaft
at 3 (pointing out that the delimited version of equivalents set forth in Festo VI undermines efforts to harmonize global intellectual property protection), available at 2001
WL 1025099; Brief of Amicus Curiae National Bar Association at 3 (“Prosecution history estoppel operates to prevent an overly broad application of the doctrine of equivalents . . . .”), available at 2001 WL 1025444; Brief of Amicus Curiae Bose Corp. at 1-2
(stating that the Federal Circuit ignored Warner-Jenkinson by expanding estoppel with
the effect of upsetting expectations of patent holders), available at 2001 WL 1040335;
Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Circuit Bar Association at 1-3 (arguing that a complete
bar violates a general tenet that the scope of estoppel limiting a patent should relate to
the conduct giving rise to it), available at 2001 WL 1025114; Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Creators et al. at 3-4 (discussing how the limits to the doctrine of
equivalents instituted by Festo VI will harm small inventors), available at 2001 WL
1025252; Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers at 3
(accusing the Federal Circuit’s absolute bar rule of sacrificing the protective function
of patents), available at 2001 WL 1025309; Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Co. et al. at 4 (stating that Festo VI “eliminates resort to the doctrine of
equivalents”), available at 2001 WL 1025380; Brief for Petitioner at 16 (“Under the his-
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relating to the Festo decisions has considered only the scope of the
doctrine of equivalents rather than the role of prosecution history es39
toppel.
This uncritical focus on the doctrine of equivalents is, quite
frankly, puzzling. An exclusive relationship between prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents is neither commanded
by the doctrine itself, nor well-supported by the historical record. Indeed, case law reveals that information produced during and before
prosecution informs almost every important inquiry in patent law, including claim construction and validity analyses. Similarly, the historical roots of prosecution history estoppel predate the emergence of
the doctrine of equivalents, and are based on theories of disclaimer

toric understanding, prosecution history estoppel limits the doctrine of equivalents . . . .”), available at 2001 WL 1025738; Brief of Amicus Curiae Fédération Internationale Des Conseils en Propriété Industrielle at 4 (asserting that the complete bar violates U.S. obligations to the international community to provide proper remedies and
deterrence from patent infringement), available at 2001 WL 1025117; Brief of Amicus
Curiae Sean Patrick Suiter at 17 (“[T]he doctrine of prosecution history estoppel precludes a patent owner from obtaining a claim construction which resurrects subject
matter surrendered during prosecution.”), available at 2001 WL 995289; Brief of Amicus Curiae Vincent P. Tassinari at 4 (“[P]rosecution history estoppel places [the] doctrine of equivalents within the structure of the Patent Act and places reasonable limits
on the doctrine.”), available at 2001 WL 995291.
39
See, e.g., Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1047 (“Prosecution history estoppel
prevents patentees from relying on the doctrine of equivalents to broaden their patents in ways that are inconsistent with the amendments or arguments they made to the
[PTO] . . . .”); Peter Corcoran, The Scope of Claim Amendments, Prosecution History Estoppel, and the Doctrine of Equivalents After Festo VI, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 166
(2001) (interpreting the significance of Festo VI as serving a patent notice function to
the public by viewing amendments as an announcement of the patent scope on which
the public can rely); Michael O. Sutton & Christopher G. Darrow, Recent Developments
in Patent Law, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 429, 430 (2001) (“[In Festo VI,] the Federal
Circuit decided . . . that a patentee is not entitled to rely upon the doctrine of equivalents to prove infringement of a particular element, if that element has been narrowed
for any purposes related to patentability during the prosecution history.”); Jacob S.
Wharton, Festo and the Complete Bar: What’s Left of the Doctrine of Equivalents?, 20 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 281, 282 (2001) (“The Festo decision tackles the multi-faceted
doctrine of equivalents . . . .”); Marc S. Hanish & Adrienne Yeung, Patent Practitioners
Beware: The Federal Circuit Releases a Manifesto, NEV. LAW., Mar. 9, 2001, at 18, 21 (explaining how Festo VI most affects patent prosecutors who must now “see into the future and determine all the possible equivalents” because of the complete bar); Janice
M. Mueller, Festo Presto! The Incredible Disappearing Doctrine of Equivalents, NEWS SOURCE
(J. Marshall L. Sch. Ctr. Intell. Prop. L., Chicago, Ill.), Winter 2001, at 8 (contending
that Festo VI promulgated a “rule that fundamentally contracts the availability of the
venerable patent law doctrine of equivalents”).
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and reliance, rather than affirmative limitations on the scope of pat40
ent rights.
A. The Universality of Prosecution History Analysis
In contrast to the narrow and wooden view of prosecution history
estoppel commonly advanced by courts and commentators, it is unquestionable that a patent’s prosecution history is relevant across a
wide range of critical analyses. Note here that I conflate what many
might view as two separate concepts: (a) prosecution history estoppel;
and (b) prosecution history information (or information generated
during, or perhaps before, the prosecution of the patent). Yet from
an informational perspective, the two are indistinct; the application of
prosecution history estoppel requires the analysis of particular prose41
cution history information. That an “estoppel” rule has only been
applied to the doctrine of equivalents is no more a difference: as
noted below, prosecution history information can affect claim scope
42
in claim interpretation under virtually identical principles. Thus, a
first task here is to look beyond the illusory nomenclature and consider the array of information conveyed by prosecution history.
1. Claim Interpretation
Perhaps the best-known use of prosecution history information
(aside from the “limitation on the doctrine of equivalents” view noted
above) is in determination of the appropriate meaning of claims.
43
Thus, in Desper Products, Inc. v. QSound Labs, Inc., the Federal Circuit
offered controlling weight to arguments made by the patentee during
prosecution, noting that “the public has the right to rely on the appli44
cants’ remarks in seeking allowance of their claims,” and that
“[p]rosecution history is an important source of . . . evidence in interpreting claims because it is a contemporaneous exchange between the

40

Cf. infra Part II.B (linking prosecution history estoppel with the doctrine of
equivalents).
41
See, e.g., Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1835 (“Warner-Jenkinson acknowledged that competitors may rely on the prosecution history, the public record of the patent proceedings.”).
42
See, e.g., Desper Prods., Inc. v. QSound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1336-37 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (interpreting language of several patents based on their prosecution history).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1337.
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applicant and the examiner.” This use of prosecution history as a
guide to claim construction has become commonplace, leading Pro46
fessor Thomas to describe the trend as “increasing[ly] vigor[ous].”
Without a doubt, the prosecution history of a patent may not (and
perhaps should not) be dispositive of all interpretive tasks. Patent law
clearly mandates the primacy of the claims, and to a lesser degree, the
47
specification. And yet this does not diminish the fact that the patent
45

Id. at 1336-37.
Thomas, supra note 8, at 186. Thomas decries this trend, arguing that the use of
prosecution histories are, generously, second-best as a mechanism for accounting for
the prior art approach, which he suggests is the only satisfactory explanation for their
use. Id. at 216-28. While I share some of Professor Thomas’s concerns about the potential inaccuracies of prosecution history and the PTO’s laxity in ensuing accurate
compilation and maintenance of these records, see id. at 186-87 (“Patent Office generation of [prosecution histories] remains uneven, often leaving surprising gaps . . . .”),
the fact remains that the patentee will often be the single person (or entity) most able
to generate relevant information concerning the relationship between the claimed invention, the prior art, and the patent disclosure. See infra Part III.A (expanding this
argument). Thus, while Thomas is right that the claims should clearly dominate any
interpretive hints drawn from the prosecution history, this acknowledgement need not
deny the value of precise contemporaneous information that might, in some cases, offer the courts the ability to reach an appropriate interpretive result. Indeed, Thomas
himself argues that claim language can, and must, be read in the context of the specification, because the specification provides detailed, statutorily mandated information
concerning the invention. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 212-13 (comparing specification to a statute’s legislative history, both of which are important interpretive tools).
Yet to the extent that further information is needed and available—say, for example,
the relationship between the invention and a key piece of prior art, or the view of the
patentee concerning the definition of a particular claim term in light of the enablement requirement—it seems illogical to forbid decision makers from reviewing it. To
say that invalidity attaches where additional information is required beyond the specification is no answer: in both of the examples above, the non-use of the contemporaneous information will not necessarily invalidate the patent, but merely increase the
likelihood of an incorrect interpretive decision, thus throwing into doubt the patent
system’s link between innovation, disclosure, and patent scope.
Thomas’s concerns about the use of prosecution history are thus better viewed as
being directed to the lack of clear and consistent processes by which the courts weigh
respective information sources in claim interpretation. If, as Thomas persuasively argues, there are strong reasons to believe on the whole that the claims and, perhaps, the
specification will be the most reliable sources of interpretive correctness, see id. at 229
(“[N]o compelling need exists for resort to prosecution histories during claim interpretation . . . .”), then the court should clearly delineate the circumstances under
which resort to non-patent information sources is acceptable. The Federal Circuit has
attempted to do so. See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d
985, 989-90 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (specifying the circumstances under which the specification and the prosecution history may be used interpretively). Though the results have
not been uniformly lauded. See, e.g., K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Divorced from context, words lose their ordinary and accustomed meanings.”).
47
See 35 U.S.C. § 112, paras. 1-2 (2000) (mandating and defining the claim and
46
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law has long recognized the value of prosecution history—contempo48
raneous, patentee-provided information.
2. Invalidity
Whether a patent is deemed invalid by a court will be influenced
49
by its prosecution history. First, to the extent that such information
illuminates claim construction, it will likewise factor heavily into an invalidity analysis. In this vein, the Supreme Court has held that a patentee who surrenders a narrowly drawn claim in favor of a broader
version may not later “fall back” to the narrow position in response to
50
a validity challenge. Again, the law recognizes that the patentee is
often the best (or only) source of contemporaneous information on
these issues, and has responded accordingly.

specification); see also supra note 46 (citing Federal Circuit precedent on the primacy
of claims in interpretation).
48
At times, various panels of the Federal Circuit have sought to “distinguish” between prosecution history estoppel as it applies to the doctrine of equivalents and the
use of prosecution history to interpret claim terms. See, e.g., Southwall Techs., Inc. v.
Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Claim interpretation in view of
the prosecution history is a preliminary step in determining literal infringement, while
prosecution history estoppel applies as a limitation on the range of equivalents . . . .”);
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 823 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (disentangling “the two
concepts”); Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (establishing the scope of a patent based on prosecution history as a means to interpret a claim
as opposed to a form of estoppel). Such efforts do little more than simply point out
the differences between claim construction and the analysis of the scope of equivalents. To be sure, the use of prosecution history in claim construction more directly
implicates literal infringement than infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
This, of course, is the point: prosecution history is recognized as being relevant in a
wide variety of contexts beyond the doctrine of equivalents.
49
Patents, while presumed valid by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000), can be declared invalid by a federal court, id. § 282(2). The presumption of validity requires
clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. See, e.g., Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc v. Hill
Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“An accused infringer alleging
that a claim is invalid must overcome the statutory presumption of validity that attaches
to an issued by proving invalidity by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence.”
(citation omitted)).
50
See, e.g., Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 221 (1940)
(“The patentee may not, by resort to the doctrine of equivalents, give to an allowed
claim a scope which it might have had without the amendments, the cancellation of
which amounts to a disclaimer.”); Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 429 (1894) (holding the patentee “estopped” from seeking to reduce his claim scope by argument to a claim that he abandoned during prosecution).
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Second, certain patentability requirements, such as the rule that
51
“new matter” may not be added to a patent’s disclosure, explicitly invoke the patent’s prosecution history. This question arises in the context of determining whether a particular claim is entitled to a corresponding filing date; § 112 requires full descriptive support for every
52
claim. Thus, the interplay between the disclosure requirement and
the prohibition on new matter often requires a detailed analysis of
precisely when certain information was added to a specification—a
53
process that is described as “difficult” and “laborious,” but one that
54
the law nonetheless values.
3. Inequitable Conduct
Professor Thomas notes yet another clear doctrinal role that
prosecution history plays in the patent law—the determination of in55
equitable conduct. Inequitable conduct is derived from the equita56
ble doctrine of unclean hands, and holds unenforceable a patent ob57
tained through bad behavior at the Patent Office.
As should be
immediately apparent, the analysis of inequitable conduct is entirely
based upon the prosecution record. This use of prosecution history
information, however, is not the same as those uses relating to the
51

35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2000) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the
disclosure of the invention.”).
52
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000) (stating the enablement and written description
requirements).
53
Thomas, supra note 8, at 231.
54
See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reviewing the assertion that patents should be disallowed a certain filing date for lack of
“adequate ‘written description’ to the claimed invention” (citation omitted)).
55
See Thomas, supra note 8, at 232-34 (“[R]elian[ce] on the prosecution history is
the doctrine of inequitable conduct.”).
56
See Precision Inst. Mfg. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945)
(noting the equitable origins of “unclean hands”).
57
See, e.g., PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315,
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (focusing on the issue of materiality with respect to false dealings); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (analyzing
an accusation of inequitable conduct in the two steps of determining the materiality of
the behavior and its culpability); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc. 141
F.3d 1059, 1069-70 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing the foundations of inequitable conduct as a defense against assertions of patent infringement); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. LexTex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (rendering a patent unenforceable
based on inequitable conduct). Typically, the “bad behavior” involves the hiding or
non-citation of relevant prior art, but occasionally it can include misinformation related to inventorship and other requirements for patentability. See, e.g., PerSeptive Biosystems, 255 F.3d at 1321-22 (invalidating a patent on grounds of misstatements to a
patent examiner).
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doctrine of equivalents, claim construction, or invalidity. Investigating
inequitable conduct does not provide additional contemporaneous
information related to the relationship between innovation, disclosure, and patent scope; instead, it simply provides information related
to the patentee’s (or her representative’s) behavior before the Patent
Office. Therefore, while inequitable conduct is clearly another doctrine that considers prosecution history-–and thus supports the proposition that the myopic equivalents-centered view of prosecution history
is incomplete—it is perhaps less surprising that such a role is often
overlooked.
In sum, it simply cannot be denied that prosecution history—that
is, contemporaneous, patentee-generated information—is a significant component of other doctrinal elements of the patent law. The
equivalents-centered view of prosecution history estoppel, then, misrepresents legal reality. The Article next turns to the historical roots
of prosecution history estoppel, suggesting that the equivalentscentered view is inaccurate along that dimension as well.
B. The Historical Roots of Prosecution History Estoppel
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive historical account of the developments of prosecution history
estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents, a few notes and observations
are in order.
First, it appears that the concept of prosecution history estoppel
originated from the concepts of disclaimers and reissues. Under the
patent law of 1836 (and prior to that in some circumstances), a patentee could amend her patent by seeking a reissue—a legal “do-over”
intended to allow patentees to save their patents when they discovered
58
potential invalidity problems. This rule worked only in one direction—a reissue could claim less than what was claimed in the original
59
60
patent, but could not expand on claims from the original. Another
58

See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS §§ 279-282 (4th ed. 1873). The reissue continues to exist today in only
slightly modified form—the major change being that reissued patents may, in some
cases, have broader claims than the original. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251-252 (2000) (outlining reissues of defective patents).
59
See CURTIS, supra note 58, § 283; see also Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co., 5 F. Cas.
235, 238 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 2485) (Story, Circuit Justice) (“[A]n inventor is always at liberty to omit a part of his original invention, if he deems it expedient, and to
retain that part only of his original invention which he deems fit to retain.”).
60
See CURTIS, supra note 58, § 282. One interesting exception to this rule is found
in Morey v. Lockwood, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 230 (1868), in which the court held that if the
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way that a patentee could amend his patent was to file a disclaimer
with the patent office. Such an act ceded any claim of rights over subject matter that the patent could not legally cover (for example, because it was not new), and served to save the patent from invalida61
tion. The roots of the prosecution history estoppel doctrine in the
concept of disclaimers and reissues are clearly observable in the cases
that first link those concepts to instances of surrender.
Perhaps the earliest clear statement of a prosecution history estoppel is Leggett v. Avery:
If, in any case, where an applicant for letters-patent, in order to obtain
the issue thereof, disclaims a particular invention, or acquiesces in the
rejection of a claim thereto, a reissue containing such claim is valid
(which we greatly doubt), it certainly cannot be sustained in this case.
The allowance of claims once formally abandoned by the applicant, in
order to get his letters-patent through, is the occasion of immense frauds
against the public. . . . As before remarked, we consider it extremely
doubtful whether reissued letters can be sustained in any case where they
contain claims that once have been formally disclaimed by the patentee,
or rejected with his acquiescence, and he has consented to such rejec62
tion in order to obtain his letters-patent.

While Leggett links the import of prosecution history to reissues,
Sergeant v. Hall Safe & Lock Co. links the concept more directly to disclaimers: “In patents for combinations of mechanism, limitations and
provisos, imposed by the inventor, especially such as were introduced
into an application after it had been persistently rejected, must be
strictly construed, against the inventor, and in favor of the public, and
63
looked upon as in the nature of disclaimers.”
The development continued from there. Leggett and Hall Safe &
Lock, among others, are cited in Shepard v. Carrigan for the proposition
that:
Where an applicant for a patent to cover a new combination is compelled by the rejection of his application by the Patent Office to narrow
his claim by the introduction of a new element, he cannot after the issue

Commissioner had rejected a claim in error, the patentee could get a reissue containing the rejected claim. This might cast doubt upon theories of prosecution history estoppel grounded in administrative exhaustion. See, e.g., 5A CHISUM, supra note 23, §
18.05[1][c] (collecting cases addressing the exhaustion of administrative remedies);
Thomas, supra note 8, at 205 (concluding that courts should respect the determinations of patent examiners instead of second-guessing through prosecution history
analysis).
61
See CURTIS, supra note 58, § 286.
62
101 U.S. 256, 259-60 (1879).
63
114 U.S. 63, 86 (1885).

2002]

RECONSIDERING ESTOPPEL

183

of the patent broaden his claim by dropping the element which he was
64
compelled to include in order to secure his patent.

Shepard was in turn cited in Sutter v. Robinson for the proposition
that the patentee “is not at liberty now to insist upon a construction of
his patent which will include what he was expressly required to aban65
don and disavow as a condition of the grant.”
Importantly, this chain of foundational cases—Leggett, Hall Safe &
Lock, Shepard, and Sutter—are not exclusively concerned with the doctrine of equivalents. Leggett and Hall Safe & Lock raise the issue of
claim construction rather than infringement by equivalents. Shepard is
somewhat less clear, and hints that the basis for the infringement
66
claim might be the doctrine of equivalents. Sutter addressed an infringement dispute over devices that “resweated” dried tobacco, using
a steaming apparatus that included tanks, boilers, and wooden tobacco containers. The only difference between the patented and accused device was that the accused infringer used tobacco shipping vessels rather than purpose-built wooden boxes, resulting in a far less
67
Importantly, the Court deter“tight” enclosure for the tobacco.
mined that—due to prosecution history information—the patent
could not, as a matter of construction, cover anything more than the
68
wooden container. Because the use of shipping vessels as containers
for resweating tobacco was known in the prior art, infringement was
69
precluded. Thus, Sutter features prosecution history as the determinant of the relationship between the claimed invention, the disclosure, and the prior art—not solely as a legal limitation on the scope of
the doctrine of equivalents.

64

116 U.S. 593, 597 (1886).
119 U.S. 530, 541 (1886) (citation omitted).
66
See 116 U.S. at 597 (describing the material elements of a claim). But see id. at
597 (“[T]he file-wrapper and contents of which we have stated the substance, make it
clear that the claim and specification of the . . . patent must be construed to include, as
their language requires, a fluted or plaited band or border as one of the essential elements of the invention.”(emphasis added)).
67
See 119 U.S. at 535 (reviewing the finding of the appellate court regarding the
differences between the devices).
68
As the Court explained:
A comparison of the patent as granted with the application very conclusively
establishes the limits within which the patentee’s claims must be confined. He
is not at liberty now to insist upon a construction of his patent which will include what he was expressly required to abandon and disavow as a condition
of the grant.
Id. at 541.
69
See id. at 542 (describing the prior art).
65
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70

As described above, in the 123 years since Leggett, prosecution
history estoppel has become ever more closely associated with the doc71
trine of equivalents. In part, this may be a function of the rising importance (and prominence) of the doctrine of equivalents, especially
after Graham v. John Deere. But this sort of increasing association does
not justify the exclusivity that characterizes the present descriptions of
72
prosecution history estoppel. It is certainly not commanded by the
historical underpinning of the doctrine, which reveals instead a role
for prosecution history in claim construction and validity determinations as well as in the analysis of the scope of equivalents. To be sure,
where applicable, prosecution history estoppel is a crucially important
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents; the point here is not to suggest otherwise. Instead, this historical snapshot demonstrates that the
current equivalents-centered view is neither commanded, nor really
supported, by the historical record. In a similar vein, the Article now
turns to the question of whether the logical structure of the purported
relationship between the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel provides support for the current view.
C. The Illogic of an Equivalents-Based Prosecution History Estoppel Theory
Though the traditional equivalents-centered view of prosecution
history estoppel finds little, if any, support in legal framework and his-

70

See supra notes 36, 38 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents).
71
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-31
(1997) (stating that the relationship between prosecution history estoppel and the
doctrine of equivalents renders the reason for filing any patent amendment relevant to
the analysis); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33, (1966) (noting, in a validity
determination, that “claims that have been narrowed in order to obtain the issuance of
a patent by distinguishing the prior art cannot be sustained to cover that which was
previously by limitation eliminated from the patent”); Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 131-32 (1942) (denying a claim of infringement on grounds
that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to recapture claims surrendered by
amendment); Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S. 784, 789 (1931) (“The
case . . . calls for the application of the principle that where an applicant for a patent . . . is compelled by the rejection of his application . . . to narrow his claim . . . he
cannot after the issue of the patent broaden his claim by dropping the element which
he was compelled to include . . . .”); Computing Scale Co. of Am. v. Automatic Scale
Co., 204 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1907) (rejecting the initial claims based on lack of invention
over prior patents); Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77, 83 (1900) (holding that patentee is estopped from excluding a claim element where element was added to overcome objections based on lack of novelty over prior patents).
72
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing problems stemming from
prosecution history estoppel’s association with the doctrine of equivalents).
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torical context, its logical failings stand out as the most striking. The
problems with the equivalents-centered view of prosecution history estoppel are fundamental; indeed, a closer look reveals that the rule has
relatively little to do with the doctrine of equivalents. This ill-advised
linkage between these two doctrines is at the root of the missed opportunity represented by the Festo decisions.
The illogic of the equivalents-centered view is best exposed by deconstructing its most prolific offspring, the basic argument made
73
against strong forms of the prosecution history estoppel, especially
the “complete bar” implemented by the majority of the Federal Cir74
cuit in Festo VI. The claim is simple: that the alteration of the rule of
prosecution history estoppel (in Festo VI, a change to a stronger form)
75
fundamentally alters the scope of the doctrine of equivalents. Yet
73

The Supreme Court in Festo VII had a slightly more subtle objection—that the
stronger form of estoppel (i.e., the reduction in equivalents when applied) “resort[ed]
to the very literalism that the equivalents rule is designed to overcome.” Festo VII, 122
S. Ct. 1831, 1834 (2002). Clearly, this argument is also premised on the estoppelequivalents linkage.
74
Festo VI, 234 F.3d 558, 569 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
75
This view is perhaps best exemplified by the hyperbolic (and virtually hysteric)
tone of the petition for certiorari in Festo VI: “This case presents a fundamental change
in patent law accomplished by the virtual abolition of the century-old ‘doctrine of
equivalents.’” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Festo VII (No. 00-1543). Despite the
self-evident interests of the petitioner to engaging in such hyperbole, a variety of
commentators have essentially followed suit. See, e.g., William M. Atkinson et al., Was
Festo Really Necessary?, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 111, 111 (2001) (“In effect,
the Festo decision may have transformed prosecution history estoppel into the exception that swallowed the rule.”); Peter J. Ayers, Federal Circuit’s Festo Is Unfriendly Toward
Patent Rights, 163 N.J. L.J. 549, 549 (2001) (“Festo represents a bold new approach to
limiting the doctrine of equivalents.”); Lawrence B. Ebert, Festo: Sea Change in Patent
Law?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Jan., 2001, at 34 (recognizing the viewpoint that Festo may
nullify the doctrine of equivalents); Mueller, supra note 39, at 8 (describing the Festo VI
rule as one which “fundamentally contracts the availability of the venerable patent law
doctrine of equivalents”). Every filing at the Supreme Court in support of the petitioner asserted that Festo VI narrowed, reduced, or even eliminated the doctrine of
equivalents. See supra note 38 (citing the briefs).
Of course, this criticism may be equally directed towards the Federal Circuit itself, which uniformly suggested that the Festo VI decision was intended to curtail the
doctrine of equivalents, though the majority seemed to admit it only grudgingly. See
Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 578 (“A complete bar reins in the doctrine of equivalents . . . .”);
id. at 600-601 (Michel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Unwittingly, the
majority has severely limited the protection previously available to patentees. Indeed,
it may nullify the doctrine of equivalents.”); id. at 620-624 (Linn, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[T]he majority unfairly tips the balance away from patentees
and towards competitors . . . .”); id. at 630-632 (Newman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (calling the majority’s decision “legally incorrect and equitably unjust,” especially since there is no cry for drastic reform of prosecution history estoppel).
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the argument collapses upon detailed inspection—taking with it the
equivalents-centered view of prosecution history estoppel.
1. Prosecution History Estoppel Limits Patent Scope Only in
Particular Circumstances
The fundamental problem with the equivalents-centered view of
prosecution history estoppel is one of logical context. That is, the estoppel-equivalents link cannot be direct, as the circumstances under
which prosecution history estoppel applies is only a small subset of the
cases implicating the doctrine of equivalents. Put more directly, in
virtually all cases, the scope of the doctrine of equivalents was precisely the same the day after the Festo VI decision as it was the day be76
fore. Likewise, the scope of equivalents remained the same after
Festo VI was vacated by the Supreme Court.
What changed was the scope of equivalents available under particularistic circumstances—namely, when the prosecution history indicates
that the patentee clarified the scope of a particular claim element for
77
a reason related to patentability. Under those facts, the range of
equivalents changed: in the pre-Festo era, the range of equivalents was
78
determined by a totality of the circumstances informing the analysis;
under the Federal Circuit’s Festo VI “complete bar” rule, there would
be no opportunity to assert that corresponding (but non-identical)
elements in an accused device or product were equivalent to those
claimed (and expressly clarified); and under the Court’s “presumptive
bar” rule, equivalents will be restricted unless the patentee can dem79
onstrate the unreasonableness of such a restriction.
Commentators who suggest that the doctrine of equivalents was
permanently narrowed by Festo VI—such as Professor Mueller, who
80
decried the decision as “facilitat[ing] ‘fraud on a patent’” —appear to
overlook the deeply contingent nature of the change in the availability
of equivalents. Specifically, the following circumstances are absolute

76

See id. at 564-65 (discussing the continued vitality of the doctrine of equivalents); cf. supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting Festo VII ’s connection between
estoppel and equivalents).
77
See Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 563-64 (summarizing the answers to the en banc questions).
78
See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(stating the pre-Festo VI rule relating to prosecution history estoppel).
79
See Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1842 (2002) (describing cases of unreasonableness).
80
Mueller, supra note 39, at 8.
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81

requirements for the “devilish[]” results flowing from a stronger
form of prosecution history estoppel:
1. A particular claim element—we’ll call it “Element X”—is not
literally found within an accused device, yet the balance of the
82
claim elements are either literally or equivalently present;
2. There must be an element in the accused device corresponding to Element X that performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the
83
same result;
3. Extending Element X to encompass its equivalents must not
capture subject matter that is an obvious variant of the prior
84
art; and
4. Element X must have been amended or clarified during
85
prosecution for a “reason[] related to patentability.”
As should be easily apparent, claims that a stronger form of estop86
pel generally, or the Festo VI decision in particular, “aboli[shed]” the
doctrine of equivalents are not only greatly exaggerated, but funda87
mentally wrong as a matter of the patent law and logic.

81

Id.
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29
(1997) (“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the
scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied
to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”); see also Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (establishing the allelements rule).
83
See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09
(1950) (outlining the doctrine of equivalents); Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters,
280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (defining equivalency under the doctrine); Pennwalt, 833 F.2d
at 934 (construing 35 U.S.C. to require a comparison of corresponding structures and
functions in determining equivalency).
84
See, e.g., K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he
doctrine of equivalents cannot allow a patent to encompass subject matter existing in
the prior art.”); Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
684 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (denying application of equivalents where the asserted equivalent
exists in the prior art).
85
Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 566-68 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33).
86
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (No. 001543); see also supra note 75 (citing sources that make this claim).
87
Note that the exact results that these commentators (and advocates) decry would
occur in the example above in the presence of a fifth criterion: that the patentee had
appeared to surrender subject matter related to the accused device. See, e.g., Litton
Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating the pre-Festo
VI rule relating to prosecution history estoppel). Accordingly, one view of the Festo VI
decision is that it reflected a determination that the costs of analyzing that fifth factor
(in terms of difficulty, inability to be consistently accurate, and uncertainty costs on the
82
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2. Prosecution History Estoppel Is Avoidable, and Thus Impacts
Prosecution Far More than Infringement
The equivalents-centered view of prosecution history estoppel also
seems to obscure the consideration of its actual effects. Rather than
88
providing a “template for free riding,” the logic of prosecution history estoppel points the way for a patentee to ensure that her claim
receives the full benefits of the doctrine of equivalents. Simply put:
89
avoid prosecution history estoppel. Rather than being hapless vic90
tims of a tyrannical anti-patent Federal Circuit, patentees could take
a number of steps to avoid any potentially deleterious consequences
of a finding of prosecution history estoppel during litigation, such as
conducting prior art research to determine the appropriate scope of
91
the claims, drafting claims more carefully, either claiming more narrowly to avoid the prior art, or crafting claims that, when amended,
maintain a broad scope of literal coverage. And as I argue in Parts III
and IV below, the beneficial effects of such behavior will far outweigh
the costs of imposing such incentives.) Thus, while prosecution history estoppel impacts only the subset of cases where equivalents are at
issue, its incentive-effects on patent prosecution (and preprosecution) behavior are universal.
3. The Only Real, Direct, Scope-Altering Effects of Estoppel Are
Transitional (and Fractional)
It must be granted, however, that there is a potentially valid concern that the change in the law marked by the series of Festo decisions

marketplace) were outweighed by the benefits of certainty and clarity that would accrue by stopping the analysis at item four.
88
Mueller, supra note 39, at 8.
89
It’s important to note that there has always been significant incentive to avoid
prosecution history estoppel, even prior to the Festo decisions. See, e.g., Festo VI, 234
F.3d at 596-97 (Lourie, J., concurring) (“Surely, when prosecuting a patent, patent
practitioners have no settled expectations of being able to assert the doctrine of
equivalents.”); see also Litton Sys., 140 F.3d at 1456 (stating the pre-Festo VI rule that
prosecution history estoppel “may have a limiting effect within a spectrum ranging
from great to small to zero” (citations and quotations omitted)).
90
See, e.g., Ayers, supra note 75, at 549 (explaining how the Federal Circuit, with
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent suits, abruptly changed the doctrine of
equivalents without regard to any controlling authority).
91
Thus, avoiding amendments that might be required by the PTO. Cf. Festo VI,
234 F.3d at 566-68 (describing the circumstances triggering prosecution history estoppel).
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92

would, at least potentially, significantly impact the many thousands
of patents that were prosecuted under pre-Festo understandings of
93
prosecution history estoppel. In other words, the argument goes, the
impact of strengthening prosecution history estoppel might fall disproportionately upon presently existing patentees.
While this argument clearly deserves consideration, it falls well
short of a convincing case. As an initial matter, it is important to note
that this form of argument—that change X in the law will impact settled expectations Y—is equally applicable to virtually any patent law
reform, especially those achieved judicially. Indeed, it is deeply ironic
that the Supreme Court noted the “settled expectations” of existing
patentees as a major factor in their decision to vacate the Festo VI opin94
ion —immediately before promulgating a wholly new “presumptive
bar” that (at least in the Court’s view) significantly strengthened es95
toppel over its pre-Festo state. Further, the argument is plainly not
confined to the patent law, but rather could be used as a means to
prevent changes in the law across virtually the entire spectrum of social ordering. This is not to suggest that such arguments are inherently specious or unpersuasive, but instead to note that they must be
(and are) surmounted anytime the law is changed.
Second, there is good reason to doubt that this transitional effect
would be dramatic. As noted above, any effect on the doctrine of
equivalents occurs only for particular claim elements, and under quite
96
specific circumstances. While it is certainly true that many patent
claims are amended during prosecution, it cannot be seriously suggested that (a) all patent claims are amended; or (b) all elements of

92

See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (noting the requirements to trigger the Festo VI rule).
93
See supra notes 78, 87, 89 (describing the pre-Festo status of estoppel).
94
Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1841 (“Inventors who amended their claims under the
previous regime had no reason to believe they were conceding all equivalents. If they
had known, they might have appealed the rejection instead. There is no justification
for applying a . . . more robust estoppel to those who relied on prior doctrine.”).
There is a particular problem with this “settled expectations” argument here: as
noted by Judge Lourie, patentees who amended their claims under the pre-Festo regime had little doubt that their patent scope was going to be significantly reduced. See,
e.g., Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 596-97 (Lourie, J., concurring) (“Surely, when prosecuting a
patent, patent practitioners have no settled expectations of being able to assert the
doctrine of equivalents.”); see also infra note 98 (discussing another example of the
“settled expectations” argument).
95
See Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1842 (asserting that, while stronger, the new rule is
“not . . . the complete bar by another name”).
96
Supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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all claims are amended. Thus, the most that can be determined is that
some elements of many claims are amended during prosecution. The
next question is whether those amended elements fall within the criteria noted above: an accused device that infringes under equivalents
but is not within any prior art; a correspondence between an element
of the claim and a substantially similar element in the accused device;
and the existence of prosecution history estoppel. This is obviously a
rather small subset of the “some elements of many claims” phraseology. But the impact is still smaller than that: under the pre-Festo regime, if the prosecution history indicated that the subject matter surrendered by the claim amendment or clarification was related to the
97
accused device, then equivalents were not extended. And yet the
circle gets smaller: under pre-Festo rules, if it was unclear what was surrendered by the patentee during prosecution, equivalents were barred
98
as well. Figure 1 stylistically depicts this analysis.

97

See, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding prosecution history estoppel applied to subject matter clearly
surrendered).
98
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33
(1997) (barring all equivalents where the purpose of an amendment is unclear). Warner-Jenkinson also provides another example of the Court’s seemingly arbitrary invocation of the “settled expectations” argument. At one point, the Court noted that “[t]o
change so substantially the rules of the game now could very well subvert the various
balances the PTO sought to strike when issuing the numerous patents which have not
yet expired and which would be affected by our decision.” Id. at 32 n.6. But then the
Court goes on to change the rules of the game:
[T]he better rule is to place the burden on the patent holder to establish the
reason for an amendment required during patent prosecution. The court
then would decide whether that reason is sufficient to overcome prosecution
history estoppel as a bar to application of the doctrine of equivalents to the
element added by that amendment. Where no explanation is established,
however, the court should presume that the PTO had a substantial reason related to patentability for including the limiting element added by amendment. In those circumstances, prosecution history estoppel would bar the application of the doctrine equivalents as to that element.
Id. at 33.
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If, for example, the set of cases diminishes by half as each criterion is reached, then the set of cases x impacted by a change in the estoppel rules would be represented by the following equation:
x=

CL
5

2

where CL is the number of litigated claims. Assume about two million
patents were issued as of the Festo VI and VII decisions, and that about
40,000 will be litigated during their term, though only about 4000 will
99
get to court. Statistics show that about half of these will be found in100
valid, so that implies a maximum potential 20,000 valid patents litigated (or a minimum of about 2000). Assume each patentee asserts,
on average, two claims per patent, yielding 40,000 potentially litigated
101
claims (or 4000 actually litigated). On these assumptions, and using
the formula above, the change in estoppel rules will impact roughly a

99

Where possible, I have based these numbers primarily on those used by Mark
Lemley in his recent study of the costs and benefits of additional “screening” by the
PTO. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1501 (2001) (“The limited data we have suggest that the overwhelming majority of
patents are neither litigated nor licensed.”). Lemley estimates that about two percent
of all outstanding patents are litigated, and that only about two-tenths of one percent
actually are addressed by courts. Id.
100
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 185 (1998).
101
And, to reiterate, they are assumptions.
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maximum of 1250 claims (or 625 patents)—just slightly more than
102
.03% of the total patents outstanding.
This Part has demonstrated that the contemporary view of prosecution history estoppel as solely a legal limitation on the scope of the
doctrine of equivalents is profoundly incomplete. Such a view is not
supported by the patent law, which reflects an extensive use of prosecution history information in analyses of claim construction and inva103
lidity, in addition to the use of prosecution history in the doctrine of
equivalents context. Further, the historical roots of the use of prosecution history estoppel neither require nor support the equivalentscentered view; instead, the traditions of the use of patentee-provided
contemporaneous information is one which encompasses analytical
inquiries beyond the doctrine of equivalents. And finally, this Part has
explored the logic of the present—limited—understanding of prosecution history estoppel, noting that the equivalents-centered view has
obscured, to a significant degree, a full consideration of the real effects of prosecution history estoppel decisions.
Having thus called into doubt the contemporary understanding of
prosecution history estoppel, the balance of this Article turns to the
development of a more complete view of prosecution history estoppel
and its role within the modern patent system. Such an undertaking
implies a theory of the administration of the patent system itself, as
explained in the next Part.
II. THE ROLE OF PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL, PART 1:
INFORMATION
The United States patent system traditionally has been justified in
terms of utilitarian notions of the use of incentives to stimulate prog-

102

Arguably, the denominator here might more appropriately be the total number of valid patents litigated. Under that view, the 625 potentially affected patents represent 3.1% of the total patents litigated (i.e., 625/20,000).
Using the number of patents that actually get into court, the percentage of all
patents affected would be .000625%, and the percentage of valid litigated patents
would be .6%.
In addition, note that to the extent that litigation rates vary by industry, see Josh
Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 476 (1995) (showing
that biotechnology patents were involved in litigation at the higher rate of 5.5%), the
effects of changing the estoppel rule will be distributed somewhat unevenly.
103
See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text (noting an array of uses of prosecution history).
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105

ress —innovation and related activities —in the “sciences and the
106
useful arts.” To this end, the current patent statute, Title 35 of the
United States Code grants the patent holder a right to exclude others
107
from the subject matter of the patent for twenty years, in exchange
for a full public explanation of the details of the invention and its op108
eration, thereby implementing a quid pro quo that is at the heart of
109
the modern patent administration system.
The phrase “patent ad104

See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social
Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 850-56 (1993) (setting forth the
utilitarian explanation for intellectual property). Of course, rights-based theories do
exist. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535-39 (1993)
(arguing for a natural rights theory of intellectual property); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 288-90 (1988) (examining intellectual
property through the lens of both labor- and personality-based theories of individual
property rights); see also DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 42-53
(2d ed. 2001) (exploring rights-based theories and collecting sources, including those
above) .
105
There are a number of activities that are stimulated by the existence of the patent system, including: inventive behavior itself, investment in innovation and research
and development, the disclosure of innovations, the commercialization of new products and services, and the development of follow-on (or “design-around”) innovations.
There are a number of excellent works describing the ways that the patent system creates these incentives, a few of which are listed here. See, e.g., CHISUM ET AL., supra note
104, at 70-75 (collecting major scholarly works concerning these incentives); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 43-44 (5th ed. 1998) (describing the
basic incentives); Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1017-21 (discussing the negative effects
of broad patent scope on improvements through complications of access to patented
material for further research); Kieff, supra note 10, at 703 (embracing a property
framework for achieving the goals of the patent system); Kitch, supra note 10, at 284-85
(arguing that the initial inventor should receive broad patent rights in order to enable
coordination of subsequent improvement efforts); Merges & Nelson, supra note 10, at
842-44 (employing economic analysis to demonstrate that inventors must be protected
to invest in new ideas without fear but should remain in a competitive environment in
order to get the most from the invention); Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent
Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws (pts. 1-5), 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 85, 159, 241, 328,
422 (1924); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research
and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29, 32 (asserting the efficiency of
protecting initial investors over later investors’ ability to obtain patents).
106
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
107
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (describing the rights of the patent holder). The
term is 20 years from the filing of the patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)
(2000).
108
See 35 U.S.C § 112 (2000) (describing the contents of a claim and specification).
109
Classically, the quid pro quo is described as a form of bargain between the inventor-patentee and society, whereby the patentee receives a right against the public in
exchange for full disclosure and a limited term. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) (“The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, use-
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ministration system” here is intended to be analytically distinct from
the phrase “patent system,” on the grounds that irrespective of the
theoretical justifications for the patent system and their implications
for patent policy, there remains the crucial (and yet perhaps less considered) mechanism for implementing whatever patent policies are
110
desired. That is, any patent system will have a series of rules, regulations, and procedures by which the underlying polices are implemented. This Article seeks to inform the contemporary arguments
surrounding the administration of the patent system, as opposed to the
system itself, starting from two basic premises: first, that the patent
system is one of proportional reward, and second, that the patent system is built upon the concept of exchange, a public disclosure in ex111
change for the public grant of rights.
A. Foundational Elements: Proportional Reward and Exchange
“Proportional reward” refers to the fact that the modern patent
system contemplates that the return from the grant of a patent will be
a function of the quantity of the innovation created—the greater the
112
113
innovation, the greater the (potential) reward. As should be obvi-

ful, and non-obvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive
right to practice the invention for a period of years.”).
110
Indeed, one additional explanation for the incompleteness of the equivalentscentered view of prosecution history estoppel is the intermingling of these two distinct
concepts: the underlying patent policies and the means by which any policies are implemented.
111
As will be seen below, the theory assumes no more than a relationship between
innovation, disclosure, and patent scope, and is thus equally applicable to broad prospect-based theories of patents. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 10, at 267 (asserting that any
patent system will have prospect elements, and the rules of a patent system can be adjusted so as to make the prospect function important). For narrower inventive-based
theories, see Merges & Nelson, supra note 10, at 868-84.
112
Of course, circumstances such as luck, timing, and non-technical skills such as
marketing and promotion factor significantly in any commercial activity, and there is
no reason to believe the commercialization of patentable inventions to be any different. Instead, the suggestion here is that—all other things being equal—a larger scope
of the grant will yield a larger return.
113
Inventors with larger advances over the prior art will be able successfully to
prosecute broader claims, see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2000) (denying entitlement
of a patent if the invention has already been described in a previous patent or obvious
at the time of invention), thereby increasing the subject matter from which they can
exclude others. On occasion, the courts have referred to “pioneer patents” as those to
which greater rights are attached due to their significant advance over the state of the
art. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997)
(noting the “judicial recognition of pioneer inventions”); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (evaluating whether a par-
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ous, this is not a necessary condition for the operation of a patent system—direct cash rewards or subsidy systems arguably could achieve at
114
least some of the policy goals of the patent system —but accurately
describes the present patent administration system. The assignment
of commercial value is left to the operation of the market; each patent
grant, by sheltering the holder from full competition within its scope,
will have a unique return based on market acceptance. A major determinant of return in such a system will be the scope of the patent
grant—that is, the scope of the right to exclude. The larger the grant,
the greater the return.
The other major premise of the patent administration system is
that of “exchange,” describing the law’s insistence that the patentee
surrender knowledge of the invention for the public franchise of a
115
Importantly, the exchange requirement in the patent law
patent.

ticular invention qualifies as pioneer in nature); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (acknowledging “broad protection for pioneer inventions”).
114
See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buy-outs: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q. J. ECON. 1137, 1137 (1998) (highlighting a system where the government
conducts auctions to “buy out” patent rights); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele,
Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 525 (2001) (proposing a
system that would reward inventors with government funds); Michael Abramowicz,
Perfecting Patent Prizes 7 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review) (“[The prize system] is more likely to encourage costeffective concessions and projects that best offset the monopoly effects of patents.”).
The proponents of the reward theories suggest that such mechanisms might provide
the incentive to invent without the potential costs of deadweight loss and inappropriate allocation of social surplus that they consider hallmarks of the present proportional
reward system. As Professor Kieff persuasively demonstrates, however, such proposals
are unlikely to provide incentives for investments in commercialization that may reflect
the most crucial incentive provided by the patent system. Kieff, supra note 10, at 70512. Kieff also notes that reward proposals do not adequately address the screening of
patents by competitors enabling the present system to distinguish between worthy and
unworthy innovations. Id. at 712-17.
115
The patent law’s basic disclosure requirement is found in § 112, specifically in
paragraphs 1 and 2:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); see also supra note 109 (explaining the quid pro quo at the
heart of patent administration).
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does more than simply mandate some disclosure–-it affirmatively links
116
the quantum of disclosure to the scope of the patent grant.
B. The Central Objective: Linking Innovation, Disclosure, and Scope
These two guiding premises—proportional reward and exchange—underlie the fundamental inquiry relating to the administration of the patent system. In one word: scope.
As should be obvious, proportional reward establishes patent
117
scope as a primary driver (though not the only factor ) in the reward
mechanism. Similarly, the exchange premise also compels consideration of scope, though the analysis is slightly different. Here, scope refers to two distinct concepts: the scope of the patent grant and the
scope of the disclosed innovation. And yet, given the exchange premise
118
of the modern patent administration system, patent grant scope is
functionally linked to innovation disclosure scope. That is, not only
119
does a patent grant follow the disclosure of innovation, but the
quantum of the patent grant will largely depend upon the quantum of
120
the disclosure.

116

The scope of the patent grant is (at least nominally) determined by the breadth
of the claims. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 370
(1996) (“The claim defines the scope of the patent grant . . . .” (citation omitted)).
The breadth of the claims is limited by the scope of disclosure, according to the § 112
requirements of enablement, see, e.g., Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co.,
159 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1895) (patentees may not claim more broadly than they teach
about their invention), written description, see, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935
F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (patentees may not claim beyond what they disclose
to have actually invented), best mode, see, e.g., Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp.,
913 F.2d 923, 926 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (patentees must provide description of the best
method of using their claims), and definiteness, see, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 368 (1938) (patentees must accurately and precisely define the invention).
117
See supra note 114 and accompanying text (addressing the system efficiencies
realized through a rewards approach).
118
See supra note 115 and accompanying text (explaining that the patent system is
premised on an exchange of knowledge of the invention for the patent right).
119
See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933)
(“[The inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is
granted.”).
120
See supra note 116 and accompanying text (citing cases in support of this
proposition). Note that the theory of patent administration sketched in this Part does
not assume equivalence between patent scope and innovation disclosure. A patentee
may claim only to the boundaries of her disclosure. See, e.g., Gentry Gallery, Inc. v.
Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[Prior cases] make clear that
claims may be no broader than the supporting disclosure, and therefore that a narrow
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Thus, the question of scope illuminates the interaction between
the two foundational premises of the patent administration system.
The quantum of reward is a function of the scope of the patent grant,
121
which is, in turn, a function of the quantum of disclosure. Thus, the
premises of proportional reward and exchange create an explicit and
direct link between the disclosure of innovations and their potential
marketplace reward. This link is not merely factual—that one exists
implies the other—but also quantitative: greater disclosure of innovations will yield correspondingly greater patent scope (and thus greater
potential commercial rewards).
To clarify the argument, note the following observation: the relationship between innovation, disclosure, and scope is established by
the patent law in such a way as to maximize social welfare. That is, the
policies animating the patent system as a whole speak to the existence
and nature of the connection between innovation, scope, and disclosure. Of course, this principle is independent of the details of the relationship. One can imagine patent policy regimes in which the inventor is allowed to claim more than she disclosed (and thus

disclosure will limit claim breadth.”). While a strict reading of § 112, supra note 115,
may support this contention, it does not accurately reflect the state of the patent law.
First, and most obviously, the doctrine of equivalents allows patentees to expand their
rights to exclude (i.e., the patent grant) beyond the literal language of the claims. See,
e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950) (applying the doctrine of equivalents to expand a claim beyond its express terms). Second,
patentees are generally allowed to draw claims that stretch at least slightly beyond their
disclosure. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d
1572, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that claims need not be limited to disclosed embodiments); see also Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 993
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that Gentry Gallery was limited to cases where the patentee had
been “crystal clear” concerning the limits of the invention). One explanation for such
claim “creep” notes that the law measures disclosure by what it suggests to those of skill
in the art rather than its bare words. See, e.g., Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 582
(1881) (asserting that persons skilled in the art to which a patent is directed “would
readily appreciate the meaning of the terms and the character of the improvement described”).
Furthermore, prospect and commercialization theories of patenting, presented
supra note 114, imply a patent scope that is at least somewhat broader than the disclosure. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 10, at 717 (arguing that the commercialization view of
the patent system is superior to the proposed reward and buy-out systems); Kitch, supra
note 10, at 287 (“The prospect [function] creates an incentive in the owner to efficiently disseminate information about the invention himself.”). Importantly, however,
even these broader views of patent scope recognize the relationship between scope and
disclosure, and thus fit easily within the theory of patent administration suggested
here.
121
Supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.

198

[Vol. 151: 159

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
122

123

invented), as well as systems that offer less coverage. As should be
apparent, the characteristics of this relationship are deeply bound up
with basic patent policy issues such as the nature and function of the
124
patent grant and its appropriate scope, temporal length, etc.
If, then, the patent law establishes a direct link between innova125
tion, disclosure, and patent scope, and if this functional relationship
implicates the underlying patent policies, then it follows that the central tenet of a patent administration system is to maintain the integrity
of that link. For only then will both the premises of proportional re126
The balance of this Article
ward and exchange be fully addressed.
turns to the ways that the patent law seeks to maintain this relationship between innovation, scope, and disclosure, noting the important
role played by prosecution history in this task.
C. Maintaining the Relationship: The Centrality of Prosecution History
The patent law contains several tools of patent administration that
support the objective of linking innovation, disclosure, and scope.
The patent administration system’s ability to meet this objective is
challenged by two fundamental concerns: the availability of information and the temporal aspects of the patent grant. Information is crucial because the link between innovation, disclosure, and scope involves a series of highly-detailed, contextual analyses, performed—at
least in some cases—by those not especially familiar with the details of
the technology. The temporal concerns arise because of the dual-

122

As noted above, supra note 112, theories of patent policy concerned with commercialization incentives or “prospects” might well lead to a rule that allows broader
rights than disclosure. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 10, at 717 (discussing commercialization); Kitch, supra note 10, at 22 (arguing for broad “prospect patents”). And, to at
least some degree, the present patent law reflects such a rule. See, e.g., Graver Tank &
Mfg., 339 U.S. at 608-09 (explaining the doctrine of equivalents); Ethicon Endo-Surgery,
93 F.3d at 1582 & n.7 (demonstrating that claims are not limited to disclosed embodiments).
123
An argument can be made that the Federal Circuit has adopted a “narrow
claiming” rule for certain biotechnological and chemical inventions. See, e.g., Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (invalidating
potentially enabled claims because the disclosure did not precisely describe them); see
also Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169-70 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (considering the relationship between disclosure and claims); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharma. Co., 927 F.2d
1200, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (same).
124
See supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing basic patent policy debates).
125
Supra Part II.A.
126
See supra Introduction (describing premises of modern patent system).
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stage nature of patent administration and the corresponding need to
maintain the appropriate links between innovation, scope, and disclosure throughout the patent’s term. A review of these concerns reveals
that prosecution history information uniquely provides an answer by
producing contemporaneous, patentee-provided information and by
ensuring that later analyses operate in the shadow of earlier understandings. Thus, prosecution history estoppel stands at the center of
the properly functioning patent administration system.
1. The Tools of Patent Administration
a. Disclosure requirements
Unquestionably, the fundamental tool of the patent administration system is the statutory disclosure requirements, codified at 35
U.S.C. § 112. Specifically, § 112 contains the following rules:
the enablement requirement—the patent document must be sufficiently descriptive so as to place the subject matter of the invention in
127
the hands of one of skill in the relevant technology;
the written description requirement—the claimed invention must be
128
adequately supported and described by the document;
the best mode requirement—the best-known mode of operation of
129
the invention must be disclosed in the patent; and

127

35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000); see, e.g., Loom Co. v. Higgens, 105 U.S. 580, 594
(1881) (“An invention relating to machinery may be exhibited either in a drawing or
in a model, so as to lay the foundation of a claim to priority, if it be sufficiently plain to
enable those skilled in the art to understand it.”); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
218, 232 (1832) (stating that one of the goals of the enablement requirement is to
“enable any person skilled in the art to make and use [the invention]”).
128
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000); see, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356,
380-81 (1822) (describing the written description requirement); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v.
Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“To fulfill the written description requirement, the patent specification ‘must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill
in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.’” (quoting In re
Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989))); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d
1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (distinguishing the written description requirement from
the enablement requirement).
129
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000); see, e.g., Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp.,
913 F.2d 923, 927-28 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that the best mode analysis consists of
both a subjective analysis—whether the inventor knew of a better mode of practicing
her claimed invention—and an objective analysis—whether her disclosure was adequate); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(describing the essence of the best mode requirement as demanding of the inventor
“‘the best mode contemplated by him, as of the time he executes the application, of carrying out his invention’” (quoting In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962))).
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the definiteness requirement—the patent document must, via the
claims, “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject mat130
ter which the applicant regards as his invention.”
For purposes of patent administration, the enablement and written description requirements work to maintain the link between the
disclosure provided in the patent document with the scope of the
claims. Enablement restrains the patentee from seeking claims that
are broader than what the patent effectively “teaches” the public (in
the form of those of skill in the relevant art) about the nature of the
131
invention.
The written description requirement similarly ties the
scope of the claims to the disclosure by requiring that the claimed in132
vention be described in adequate detail.
The definiteness requirement ensures that the claims are clear and distinct enough for such
133
analyses.
Correspondingly, the best mode and the written description requirements each enforce a relationship between the patent disclosure
and the innovation itself. The best mode requirement ensures that
130

35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2000); see, e.g., United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith
Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942) (“The statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness in claims is met only when they clearly distinguish what is claimed from what
went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise.”); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1938) (“Recognizing that most inventions represent improvements on some existing article, process, or machine . . . Congress requires of the applicant ‘a distinct and specific
statement of what he claims to be new, and to be his invention.’” (quoting Merrill v.
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876))).
131
See, e.g., Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d
1190, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The enablement requirement ensures that the public
knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate
with the scope of the claims. The scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the
scope of enablement.”).
132
See Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479 (“[I]n a given case, the scope of the right to
exclude may be limited by a narrow disclosure [under the § 112 written description
requirement].”). Note that while the courts insist that the written description requirement is distinct from enablement, see Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563 (“[W]e hereby
reaffirm, that 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, requires a ‘written description of the
invention’ which is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement.”), others
are less than certain, see, e.g., Mark Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the
“Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62-63 (2000) (“[N]either the Federal Circuit nor the C.C.P.A. has ever
articulated a persuasive rationale for distinguishing the written description requirement from the enablement requirement.”); Kevin Rhoades, The Section 112 “Description
Requirement”–-A Misbegotten Provision Confirmed, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 869,
869 (1992) (“[T]here is in fact no justification for carving out a separate ‘description
requirement’ for the ‘enablement requirement’ in § 112.”).
133
See, e.g., United Carbon, 317 U.S. at 236 (“[T]he claims must be reasonably clearcut to enable courts to determine whether novelty and invention are genuine.”).
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patentees will provide adequate detail about the preferable operation
134
of their innovation. And the written description requirement, here,
135
links the inventor’s actual intellectual activity with what is disclosed.
Thus, the § 112 disclosure requirements set forth the most significant mechanism by which the patent administration system maintains
the link between innovation, disclosure, and scope.
b. Determining patent scope
The tools used to measure and analyze patent scope also reflect a
singular concern with the identified goals of patent administration.
Claim construction principles hold that the disclosure will often de136
termine the scope of the claim. Further, the use of the “doctrine of
equivalents” to expand the right to exclude is justified on the grounds
137
that it better reflects the intellectual contribution of the inventor.
Even more obscure principles of patent scope analysis explicitly
link the concepts of innovation, disclosure, and scope. For example,
the judicial recognition of “pioneer inventions” and the purported
134

See, e.g., Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“The purpose of the best mode requirement is to restrain inventors from applying for a patent while at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their inventions which they have in fact conceived.”); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[Best mode] is a requirement that
the quid pro quo of the patent grant be satisfied. One must not receive the right to
exclude others unless at the time of filing he has provided an adequate disclosure of
the best mode known to him of carrying out his invention.”).
135
See 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 7.04 (2001) (arguing that the written
description requirement serves as a mechanism for ensuring that the patentee, as of
the filing date, actually had possession of the invention).
136
See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”);
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“For claim
construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains
the invention and may define terms used in the claims.”).
137
As the Court noted in Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853):
It is this new mode of operation which gives it the character of an invention,
and entitles the inventor to a patent; and this new mode of operation is, in
view of the patent law, the thing entitled to protection . . . .
....
Now, while it is undoubtedly true, that the patentee may so restrict his claim
as to cover less than what he invented, or may limit it to one particular form of
machine, excluding all other forms, though they also embody his invention,
yet such an interpretation should not be put upon his claim if it can fairly be
construed otherwise.
Id. at 341.
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138

award of broader scope to such inventions is a direct link between
innovation and patent scope. And the use of prior art as an affirmative limit on the patent scope is likewise a recognition of the relationship between the quantum of innovation and the scope of the patent
139
grant.
2. The Challenges of Patent Administration: Information and Era
a. Information dependencies
The analyses underlying both the disclosure requirements and the
limits of patent scope are highly information-dependent.
The disclosure requirements necessitate consideration of the objective “level of ordinary skill” in the relevant technology, a consideration of the precise metes and bounds of the information contained in
the patent disclosure, and the subjective understanding of the patentee about the best way of using the invention. These requirements
138

See generally John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 43 (1995) (discussing the possibility that an examiner
might read a claim more broadly than the inventor intended). The idea is that the
courts will give a broader range of equivalents to a pioneer invention. See WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 n.4 (1997) (noting the judicial recognition of pioneer inventions); Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405, 415 (1908) (“‘[A] greater degree of liberality and a wider range of equivalents are permitted where the patent is of a pioneer character than when the invention
is simply an improvement, may be the last and successful step, in the art theretofore
partially developed by other inventors in the same field.’” (quoting Cimiotti Unhairing
Co. v. Am. Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399, 406 (1905))); Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S.
186, 207 (1894) (“The range of equivalents depends upon the extent and nature of the
invention. If the invention is broad or primary in its character, the range of equivalents
will be correspondingly broad, under the liberal construction which the courts give to
such inventions.”); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528,
1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A pioneer invention is entitled to a broad range of equivalents.”); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“[P]ioneers . . . deserve broad
claims to the broad concept.”); see also supra note 113 (discussing pioneer patents).
139
The linkage here is that the quantum of innovation–-the “distance” between
the patented invention and its prior art–-will determine its scope; the greater the innovation, the greater the “distance” from the prior art, and thus the greater potential
scope. Typically, these “prior art limitations” on patent scope are associated with the
doctrine of equivalents, see, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[Prior art] limits the range of possible
equivalents of a claim.”), but in reality, prior art always provides a limit on the scope of
claims, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2000) (establishing novelty and non-obvious subject
matter as requirements of patentability); see also K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d
1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that obvious variants of the prior art will limit the
scope of the doctrine of equivalents); Conroy v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[P]rior art restricts the scope of equivalency that the party alleging
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents can assert.”).
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also necessitate consideration of some of these factors in parallel, such
as whether one of ordinary skill would have: been able to create the
invention from the given disclosure, determined that the patentee was
actually in possession of the invention, understood the best method of
the invention’s use, and understood the boundaries of the claims
themselves.
Similarly, a patent scope determination is laden with consideration of the quantum of innovation (i.e., the differences between the
140
prior art and the claimed invention), the appropriate meaning of
141
both technical and non-technical language, whether certain language or descriptions in the disclosure were intended to limit the
142
claims, and what sorts of things are technologically “equivalent” to
143
elements of the invention.
Thus, a major (and obvious) challenge in the patent administration system is generating an appropriate amount of relevant and reli144
able information.
140

This determination will be relevant to considerations of whether a patent is to
be granted “pioneer” status, supra note 113, as well as the ways that variants of the prior
art might serve to limit the scope of the patent, supra note 139.
141
The general rule is that the “ordinary meaning” of claim language controls,
unless the patentee has provided an alternative definition or the term renders the
claim unclear. See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985,
989 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The general rule is, of course, that terms in the claim are to be
given their ordinary and accustomed meaning.”). The ordinary meaning of technology-specific terms is that one of ordinary skill in the art would ascribe to the term. See,
e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting
that “the words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning”).
142
See, e.g., Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249-51
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing the challenge in determining whether to use language
from the specification to inform the meaning of claim terms).
143
See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609
(1950) (“What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the
patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in the
patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a
vacuum.”).
144
Jay Kesan and Mark Banik note this problem as well, suggesting that one solution might be to offer issued patents a high presumption of validity over disclosed
prior art, thus providing incentives for patentees to produce prior art to the PTO. Jay
P. Kesan & Mark Banik, Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R & D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 48-54 (2000).
While providing the PTO with additional information is undoubtedly good, the KesanBanik mechanism for doing so-–strongly privileging the validity decisions of the PTO
over those of the courts, cf. Quad Envtl. Techs. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d
870, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The courts are the final arbiter of patent validity and, although courts may take cognizance of, and benefit from, the proceedings before the
patent examiner, the question is ultimately for the courts to decide, without deference
to the rulings of the patent examiner.”)-–may be detrimental given the nature of the
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b. Era
There are many important timeframes—or eras—in which the
patent administration system evaluates and enforces the relationship
between innovation, disclosure and scope.
First, there are various key dates pertaining to a patent that are
used as analytic touchstones frameworks. The quantum of innovation
145
is measured as of the date of invention; certain aspects of the disclo146
sure requirement are viewed as of the filing date.
Second, there at least two phases in the patent administration system—prosecution before the PTO, and litigation during an enforce147
ment action in the courts. Patent scope determinations occur dur148
149
ing patent prosecution and during litigation (possibly years apart).

proceedings before the PTO. For example, the ex parte prosecution process suggests
that the PTO may be less likely to conduct a full analysis than courts. Further as I argue in Part III.A infra, the same beneficial effect can be achieved by the imposition of a
strong form of the prosecution history estoppel rule.
145
Absent statutory bars, novelty and nonobviousness are measured as of the date
of the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (stating that an inventor is not entitled to a
patent, inter alia, if her “invention was known or used by others in this country . . . before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent”); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (“A
patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made . . . .”). Accordingly, determinations
based on the quantum of innovation-–such as “pioneer status” or prior art limitations
on patent scope–-also use this lens. See supra note 113 (discussing how some courts
have given greater rights for a significant advance over state of the art). Curiously, the
written description requirement, like most disclosure requirements, appears to be
measured as of the filing date of the patent application, but clearly implicates the intellectual activity surrounding the date of invention. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 135, § 7.04
(discussing the goal of written description as confirming the date of invention).
146
See, e.g., Transco Prods., Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 557
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (date for determining compliance with the best mode requirement
for reissue application is the filing date of the original application); In re Glass, 492
F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (sufficiency of specifications judged as of the filing date).
147
It might be argued that there is an intermediate phase of patent analysis which
is perhaps as important as the other two: a “public evaluation” phase, where competitors and potential licensees of the patentee evaluate the scope and strength of the patent. This is not considered here, as it is not formally a part of the patent administration process. But cf. Lemley, supra note 99, at 1497 (exploring whether the PTO phase
of administration might be better conducted by private parties).
148
The patent office will determine the scope of proposed claims in order to
evaluate compliance with validity and disclosure requirements. See, e.g., In re Graves, 69
F.3d 1147, 1152, (Fed. Cir. 1995) (evaluating the PTO’s claim construction); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting the PTO’s rules of claim construction); In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (asserting that the
“broadest reasonable interpretation” rule of construction by the PTO “serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given broader
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Other determinations, such as “pioneer status” or the application of
the doctrine of equivalents, occur only during litigation. Still other
150
analyses appear to occur anytime and no time in particular.
This temporal array poses distinct challenges for a patent administration system. First, the maintenance of the relationship between
innovation, disclosure, and scope requires the consistent application
of the administrative tools, even when the analyses are conducted at
different times. For example, consideration of whether the patent
scope is appropriately enabled by the disclosure will be conducted
151
both by the PTO and (in theory ) by a court during litigation–-using
152
the same analytic timeframe of the filing date as a measuring device.
Thus it becomes critical, from a patent administration perspective, to
have both constant enablement standards, as well as constant information. That is, the only way to ensure that the link between disclosure
and scope is being maintained across the phases of patent analysis is
to ensure that the information used in the earlier PTO phase is maintained for use during the later litigation phase.
Second, the nature of the analyses conducted calls for contemporaneous–-or as near as possible–-information. Again, consider enablement, which is measured through the lens of the knowledge of the
153
relevant field as of the filing date of the patent application. As the
filing date becomes distant, the potential for cognitive biases, such as
154
a hindsight bias, increases.
The combination of informational and temporal challenges noted
above poses difficulties for a theory of patent administration based on
scope than is justified”).
149
Allison & Lemley find the temporal gap between prosecution and litigation to
be twelve years on average. Allison & Lemley, supra note 100, at 237.
150
For example, the definiteness requirement.
151
Assuming the patent is litigated, and that invalidity due to lack of enablement is
raised, of course.
152
Supra note 146.
153
Id.
154
The hindsight bias is defined as the tendency of actors to overestimate the exante prediction that something would happen after it actually did. See Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147 (1991) (reviewing literature on hindsight
bias); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1095-1100 (2000)
(discussing hindsight bias). In the example, here, a hindsight bias would increase the
likelihood that the decision maker would uphold the patent, as post-filing technological developments would make the disclosure enabling. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v.
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discussing the pernicious effects of
hindsight in the patent context (there, obviousness analysis)).
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enforcing a link between innovation, disclosure, and scope. As the
next Part suggests, these problems are (and can be) largely addressed
by the application of prosecution history to the analyses.
3. The Centrality of Prosecution History Estoppel
As noted at some length above, the concept of prosecution history
estoppel is not new (nor even particularly obscure) in the patent
155
law.
What has been seriously misunderstood, however, is the role
that prosecution history information plays across the range of issues
156
addressed by the patent administration —as well as any analysis of
prosecution history within the context of a theory of the patent administration system.
This Part provides that broader view, arguing that prosecution history information is uniquely appropriate to solving the informational
and temporal challenges presented by the patent administration system. In addition, prosecution history estoppel itself explicitly links
the quantum of innovation to the scope of the patent grant, thereby
directly supporting the goals of the patent administration system.
a. Addressing information and timing
The argument here is straightforward. Prosecution history information is, by definition, information that is provided by the patentee
during prosecution. As such, prosecution history information has several features that address the informational and timing problems
noted above:
Accuracy. As suggested above, many, if not all, of the inquiries in a
patent administration system will require detailed contextual analyses
157
involving the particular innovation. The single individual or entity
with the most accurate and reliable information about the innovation
and its technological context—such as its relationship to the prior art,

155

See generally supra Part I.B (summarizing the origins of prosecution history estoppel).
156
See supra Part I (exploring the incompleteness of the current equivalentscentered view). Again, I am not distinguishing here between prosecution history information, and the subset of such information that triggers prosecution history estoppel. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining this). As noted above, an
important exception to this misunderstanding is Professor Thomas’s work on the role
of prosecution history information in the claim construction context. Thomas, supra
note 8, at 190.
157
In the case of multiple inventors. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2000) (defining
joint inventorship).
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for example—is the patentee. Accordingly, we should expect that
prosecution history information will be among the most accurate
158
sources available.
158

Professor Thomas suggests that prosecution history information is unlikely to
be useful because it is (a) relatively informal; (b) difficult to discern aspects relied
upon by the patent examiner; (c) and perhaps subject to manipulation by strategic
patentees. Thomas, supra note 8, at 200-05. And yet none of these objections truly
undermines the utility of prosecution history information. Objections as to the relative
informality of the prosecution process are at once circular (if due weight was placed on
prosecution histories, patentees would adjust accordingly) and inaccurate. As Thomas
himself notes, in a post-Warner-Jenkinson world (and even more so in a post-Festo world)
patentees are clearly taking prosecution histories quite seriously. Id. at 200; see also Michael Melton, Patents as Public Notice, or How to Read a Patent Prosecution History, in
COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION 453, 476 (PLI Patents, Trademarks & Literary
Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-479, 1997) (“[A] practitioner should take pains
to ensure that the prosecution history can withstand scrutiny . . . .”); Mueller, supra
note 8, at 505-10 (explaining that patents should be drafted and prosecuted in a manner that recognizes the consequences of prosecution history estoppel). In any event,
patent practitioner practice before the PTO is under oath. 37 C.F.R. § 1.63 (2001).
Objections as to the scale and scope of prosecution histories are no more availing. Whether a particular argument is relied upon by the examiner or the public is
irrelevant to a broad conception of the relevance of prosecution history information.
See supra Part I.A (describing uses of prosecution history). Thomas is correct, as noted
above, that the use of the term “estoppel” is something of a misnomer in this context.
See Thomas, supra note 8, at 202 (“Even a cursory examination reveals that the doctrine
of prosecution history analysis is entirely misnamed.”).
The argument that patentees will behave strategically in developing prosecution
history information, see, e.g., Mueller, supra note 8, at 502-10 (advocating various forms
of strategic behavior), is beside the point. There are as likely to be strong incentives to
provide accurate information (i.e., to legitimately explain the distinction from a newly
discovered piece of prior art) so as to convince the examiner as to provide misleading
information to trick a court sometime later. During prosecution, litigation is uncertain
and far-off; the rejections by the examiner are a current and meaningful reality. Further, to the extent that patentees provide alternative arguments, see Thomas, supra
note 8, at 203 (“Pragmatic pressures often cause applicants to adopt something of a
shotgun approach.”), then they risk being hoisted by the petard of their gamesmanship, so to speak. See, e.g., Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573,
1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (choosing the narrower–-and patentee-harmful–interpretation of a claim term that had been given “muddled and contradictory”
meanings by the patentee in the prosecution history).
This is not to suggest that the existence and accuracy of prosecution history information requires the privileging of that information over that provided by the claims
or the disclosure. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (requiring patentees to include a
“written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it” that concludes with “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention”). As
noted above, supra note 47, suggesting that prosecution history information might be
useful is different from arguing that the patent document should give way to such information. Rather, the argument here is that in those cases where resort to non-patent
document information is useful (and perhaps necessary), prosecution history is likely
to provide a particularly accurate source.
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Relevance. Prosecution history information is necessarily directed
to aspects of the patented innovation and its context. Accordingly,
such information is highly likely to be more directly relevant than any
other possible source in that same context.
Contemporaneously generated. Prosecution history is, by definition,
generated during the prosecution of the patent. Accordingly, to the
extent that information about the then-existing (or nearly-then159
existing) state of affairs is required, prosecution history will be useful, and likely to be more useful than many other possible sources,
such as post-hoc litigation-driven expert testimony or the like.
From the low-cost producer. There are costs related to the generation
of accurate and relevant information. In the context of a particular
innovation, the patentee has both access to the most information
(e.g., she can best determine the type and form of useful information)
160
and can best avoid socially wasteful information production.
Easily collected, maintained, and accessed. Because such information
is in essence a record of exchanges with the PTO, prosecution history
is easily (and routinely) collected and maintained. Accordingly,
prosecution history records are easily obtainable by members of the
161
public.
These features of prosecution history information make it a
uniquely useful candidate for use in inquires related to the relationship between innovation, disclosure, and patent scope. By offering reliable, accessible, contemporaneous, and relevant information, prosecution history information can play an important role in addressing
information and timing concerns in a patent administration sys-

159

See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text (describing the temporal aspects
of patent administration analyses).
160
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989) (noting the social benefits of
producing information from the most informed party to a transaction); Kesan &
Banik, supra note 144, at 36-37 (suggesting that the patentee is best informed about
the prior art in the context of high-technology inventions and should thus be induced
to produce information).
161
Access could be better: as Thomas aptly notes, in contrast to the patent documents themselves–-which are available from a number of sources and widely publicized–-prosecution histories must be specifically ordered from the PTO for a “not inconsequential” fee. Thomas, supra note 8, at 201-02. And yet the costs of providing
broader access might not be justified in light of the fact that relatively few patents are
considered important in the marketplace, and even fewer are actually litigated. See
Lemley, supra note 99, at 1497 (suggesting that the low numbers of important patents
do not justify more stringent review of patent applications by the PTO); see also Merges,
supra note 5, at 595 (same).
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162

tem —a role that, as noted above, the patent law to a large degree
163
already recognizes.
b. Supporting the relationship
In addition to addressing—and perhaps solving—the informational and timing problems in a relationship-centered theory of patent
administration, prosecution history estoppel directly supports such a
notion, introducing the patentee’s conception of that relationship.
The argument proceeds as follows. A rule that the patentee cannot recover during an enforcement action any subject matter that she
164
surrendered during the prosecution of the patent means that the
actions taken by the patentee during prosecution will directly impact
the scope of the right to exclude. In other words, the patentee’s view
of the relationship between her disclosed invention, the content of
the prior art, and the standards of patentability should be credited—
165
and perhaps even dispositive at times—of the patent scope.
Such a rule comports well with the goals of the patent administration by producing valuable information about the relationship between innovation, scope, and disclosure. In addition, as noted above,
such information has significant advantages such as accuracy and its
166
contemporaneous nature. As this Part has demonstrated, an appropriate view of the role of prosecution history information in the patent administration reveals the central role that such information
plays–-both in solving difficult informational problems inherent in any
system of patent administration, and by directly providing contemporaneous, patentee-provided information about the context of the innovation at issue. The next Part will discuss the application of prosecution history information, especially the use of prosecution history
estoppel to limit the scope of the patent grant.

162

See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing these concerns).
Supra Part I.A.
164
This is the classic statement of prosecution history estoppel. See, e.g., Keystone
Driller Co. v. Northwestern Eng’g Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 48 (1935) (“Where . . . broad
claims are denied and narrower substituted, the patentee is estopped to read the
granted claim as the equivalent of those which were rejected.”); see also 5A CHISUM,
supra note 23, § 18.05[2][a] (collecting cases).
165
See Keystone Driller, 294 U.S. at 48 (holding the patentee to the narrow interpretation of its claim that it had previously forwarded). See Part III for a discussion of the
reasons for crediting prosecution history information.
166
See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the information advantages of prosecution history).
163
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III. THE ROLE OF PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL, PART 2:
INCENTIVES
As argued above, prosecution history estoppel lies at or near the
center of the modern patent administration system, providing substantial informational support to the series of detailed and difficult
analyses that are conducted to evaluate, grant, and enforce a patent
right. This Part provides an affirmative normative defense of this role
for prosecution history estoppel, arguing that the use of such information, appropriately understood, is likely to be socially beneficial because prosecution history estoppel also creates important incentives
for patentees to act in socially desirable ways.
While it is commonplace to describe prosecution history estoppel
167
as merely a scope-limiting rule, a far more robust and significant
theory builds from the understanding of the role of prosecution history estoppel as integral to the patent administration system. As noted
above, prosecution history information is central to maintaining the re168
lationship between innovation, disclosure, and scope.
But the role of prosecution history estoppel as an integral element
of the patent administration system has an additional, and perhaps
even more important, component: that of providing incentives to prospective patentees to engage in activities and behaviors that benefit
the patent administration system. To this end, prosecution history estoppel can be conceived as an information-forcing default rule, providing strong incentives to patentees to provide useful information
concerning their innovation and its context. Similarly, a robust
prosecution history estoppel regime can serve to force patentees to internalize search costs that otherwise are borne less efficiently by the
public. And finally, prosecution history estoppel also serves to support
the institutional role of the PTO as the body with the most technological expertise in the patent administration. This Part explores each
of these insights in turn.
For purposes of this Part, I will assume a strong form of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel: that the amendment (or per169
haps clarification) of patent claims during prosecution will have sig-

167

See supra Part I (arguing that the rule cannot be merely scope-limiting).
See supra Part II (discussing the policies animating the patent administration
system).
169
See, e.g., Festo VI, 234 F.3d 558, 564-65 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that
both claim amendments and arguments related to claim scope can create a prosecution history estoppel); see also Thomas, supra note 8, at 197 (same).
168
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nificant consequences in the determination of patent scope. In the
paradigmatic example, the amendment of a particular claim element
171
In
would result in no equivalents of that element being extended.
Part IV below, I will take up the issue of whether this rule can be relaxed without damage to the incentive scheme.
A. Prosecution History Estoppel as Information-Forcing
In cases where the information available to decision makers is incomplete or costly to discover, law and economics scholars have long
recognized the importance of establishing default rules that serve social ends. For example, in the area of incomplete contracts, many
academics have argued for a series of default rules that represent what
the parties to contracts “would have wanted” had they been able to
172
negotiate properly, typically under the theory that in the absence of
large transaction costs, parties will reach mutually beneficial arrange173
ments.
Significantly, however, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner have
suggested that the “would have wanted” approach overlooks the opportunity to use the default rules to limit the ability of parties to be174
That is,
have strategically when disclosing material information.
Ayres and Gertner posit that a significant source of contractual incompleteness (i.e., a lack of complete information about the bargain
that the parties wanted) is strategic rather than the result of bargaining
175
Put simply, well-informed parties
or information-collection costs.
might withhold information that (if known) would allow a more socially beneficial deal, in order to maximize the private gains from the
176
transaction.

170

This is what the various Festo opinions described as the “complete bar” rule.
See, e.g., Festo VI, 235 F.3d at 564 (discussing forms). I discuss choosing among forms of
estoppel in Part IV infra.
171
Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 569.
172
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 102 (1985) (describing the rule of limited liability as a
default rule); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALE L.J. 353, 361 (1988) (“A default rule . . . resolves disputes according to the
contract that most well-informed persons would have adopted if they were to bargain
about the matter.”).
173
See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 88-89 (noting arguments for default
rules).
174
Id. at 94; see also POSNER, supra note 105, at 140-41 (illustrating strategic behavior with asymmetric information).
175
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 93-94.
176
Id. at 94.
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A recognition that such behavior is socially harmful leads Ayres
and Gertner to propose the use of information-forcing default rules,
rules that provide significant incentives to well-informed parties to
177
provide socially beneficial information.
These default rules need
not be those the parties would have chosen themselves—indeed, Ayres
and Gertner suggest that the best tool might be penalty defaults, those
that might be disfavored. These penalty defaults can be avoided (in
contractual terms, “contracted around”), allowing parties to choose
between the costs of bearing the penalty or producing the informa178
tion required to avoid the default rule.
Prosecution history estoppel easily fits into a theory of penalty de179
fault rules. Put simply, a rule that the reduction of patent scope results from the amendment or clarification of claims during prosecution establishes a penalty for the failure to produce adequate
information at the outset of the prosecution process. And this penalty
is only a default condition: patentees can avoid it by producing such
information, or can choose to absorb the penalty. I unpack this argument below.
1. Incomplete Information
The administration of the patent system, as I have argued above, is
primarily occupied with the problem of incomplete information, particularly information about the relationship between innovation,
180
Virtually all parties involved in the patent
scope, and disclosure.
administration system—the PTO, competitors, the public, and the

177

Id. at 97.
Id. at 94-95.
179
Kesan and Banik similarly suggest that the patent law can be informed by the
literature of incomplete contracts. Kesan & Banik, supra note 144, at 23-34. To that
end, they suggest a rule (at least in high technology contexts) that provides incentives
to patentees to conduct prior art searches in exchange for an additional presumption
of validity as against the discovered prior art. Id. at 26-27. Modeling such a rule, they
argue that it is likely to be socially optimal because it both benefits the patentees and
provides additional information to the patent office.
I am intrigued by Kesan and Banik’s proposal and agree that solving the information gap problem is crucial to patent policy. Given the existence of prosecution history estoppel, however, it is not clear that any additional incentives are needed to procure additional information. Furthermore, the information that is most likely to be
asymmetric in favor of the patentee (and thus most desirable to stimulate the production of) is not necessarily prior art information, but instead information about the
claimed invention and its context. The Kesan and Banik proposal would not automatically increase the production of that sort of information.
180
See supra Part II.B (explaining this further).
178
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courts—are substantially underinformed about this central question
and its variants (e.g. whether a patent’s scope will cover an accused
181
device). To some degree, this is a function of the inherent ambigu182
ity in the use of language to describe inventions, and it is unrealistic
to expect that all uncertainty can be removed. Yet there can be little
doubt that additional information would likely result in better evaluations, at least if the cost of providing that additional information is
relatively low.
2. A Well-Informed Participant
Among the “parties” to the patent transaction, the patentee is either the best informed or the one who can most easily and cheaply
183
become the best informed about the context of her innovation.
Consider prior art: as several commentators have noted, the PTO, despite efforts to the contrary, is likely to be underinformed, especially

181

Lemley notes that the PTO is inherently underinformed, and presents a defense of that condition as being cost-justified. Lemley, supra note 99, at 1499-1511.
182
As noted in Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967):
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of
drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the
requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows for
unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary does not
always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the
sake of words, but words for things.
Id. at 397.
183
The patent law does not assume that a patentee is of any particular skill in the
art, see, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453-54 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (stating that since 1953, there has been no presumption that the inventor is
familiar with prior art), thus it might be argued that the assumption that the patentee
is best able to become informed, say about the prior art, is unreasonable, see, e.g., Festo
VI, 234 F.3d 558, 624 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the costs of prior art searches for patentees will be
unreasonable). And yet this objection fails to suggest a socially better locus for this
cost.
Lemley’s important work on the costs and benefits of ensuring patent validity
during the prosecution process might provide an answer. E.g., Lemley, supra note 99,
at 1499-1508. Rather than forcing all patentees to conduct prior art searches-–and
thereby absorb that cost–-shifting that cost to competitors (who will then choose only a
small subset of patents to conduct searches on) might be efficient. Id. And yet it is not
clear whether this would hold any advantage over an estoppel-induced default rule.
Patentees, who are likely to be relatively well-informed about the importance of their
patent, can choose whether or not to avoid the penalty. Second, the costs of litigation
(which must include the risks of incorrect results and costs of uncertainty) are quite
likely to result in the dramatic undersearching of prior art by competitors.
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184

in many technological areas.
Competitors or the public more generally will have incentives to become informed, but only after the patent issues and appears to be a threat. And the public is unlikely to be
as well-positioned as the patentee to lower the costs of searching for
prior art.
Furthermore, there are a number of questions in the patent law in
which the information may only be usefully obtainable from the patentee. A clear case of this is the claimed invention’s relationship to
the prior art, and, relatedly, its scope. For while the patentee is explic185
itly required to use the claims as clear explanation of scope, claim
186
Furthermore, the patent law
language must still be interpreted.
recognizes that the scope of an invention is commensurate with the
187
invention, not just the claim language. The patentee is in full possession, during and prior to prosecution, of this information; the rules
and tools used in the patent law are efforts to recreate this knowl188
edge.
3. Strategic Behavior
Given the asymmetry of information, the incentives for a patentee
189
to fail to produce relevant information are substantial. Even assuming that an invalid patent would either be “costless” because it re-

184

See, e.g., Kesan & Banik, supra note 144, at 26 (discussing the likelihood that the
PTO is underinformed regarding prior art in high-technology patents); Lemley, supra
note 99, at 1499 (noting that the prosecution process involves “surprisingly little actual
assessment of whether a patent should issue”); Merges, supra note 5, at 595 (noting the
high risk of error at the PTO).
185
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
186
See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989-92
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (describing and utilizing the tools of claim construction).
187
See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950) (“[C]ourts have also recognized that to permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the
patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”).
188
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27
(1997) (discussing rules for doctrine of equivalents as they relate to the patentee’s intent); Johnson Worldwide Assocs., 175 F.3d at 989-92 (discussing rules for claim construction).
189
Patentees are forbidden from misleading the PTO or affirmatively withholding
material information, 37 C.F.R. § 1.156 (2001), so outright lying is not really an issue.
However, the rules do not require that the patentee perform a prior art search, draw
her initial claims narrowly to the boundaries of the prior art, or provide additional
contextual information relating to the scope of the patent.
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190

mained unused, or eventually was struck down by a court, the presumption of validity and the high costs of patent litigation offer strong
incentives for the patentee to affirmatively avoid producing information relating to patent scope—that is, precisely the sort of information
that might allow the PTO and the public to more usefully evaluate the
191
scope of the patent. Furthermore, to the extent that some information is either singularly in the possession of the patentee or is very
costly (in terms of actual costs of production, error costs, uncertainty,
192
etc.), then the possibility of producing that information absent patentee production greatly diminishes. This raises the possibility that
invalid or otherwise inappropriately broad patents would survive to
distort the marketplace.
In any case, the patentee has both the motive and the opportunity
to behave strategically. Such behavior can take many forms. It might
involve declining to conduct a thorough prior art search, thus transferring this cost to the public as well as increasing the possibility that
193
the PTO will “miss something” and allow the unwarranted scope.
Perhaps a patentee will draw inappropriately broad claims, hoping
that the prosecution process will only minimally (if at all) pare the

190

Most issued patents are not asserted or licensed. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note
99, at 1503 (noting that many patents either lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees,
or are never litigated). Accordingly, such patents, even if technically invalid, would
not cause social harm in the marketplace. Id.
191
Patentees with invalid patents should be able to settle cases with rational market players for slightly less than the cost of litigation, which in the patent field averages
$2 million—or at least an order of magnitude greater than typical prosecution costs.
Id. at 1502 n.28. Also note that an issued patent in a given field might be used as a
threat against many market players.
192
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (asserting that the patentee is in the
best position to provide information).
193
Note in this regard that the present patent law might be affirmatively suboptimal by creating incentives for a patentee not to become fully informed prior to filing
the patent. The doctrine of inequitable conduct can be used as a defense to infringement where a patentee has either misled or failed to disclose material information to
the PTO. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (holding that the infringed patent was unenforceable on inequitable conduct
grounds). Importantly, the Federal Circuit has established a test that allows for even
very low levels of intent to trigger inequitable conduct, given the nondisclosure of important enough information. Id. Thus, if a patentee conducted an extensive prior art
search, and noted only the relevant materials uncovered to the examiner, she might be
vulnerable to an inequitable conduct change if it turned out that a non-disclosed reference was somewhat important. On the other hand, if the patentee revealed all the
materials—relevant and irrelevant—then she might again be vulnerable: this time to a
charge that she “buried” the relevant references.
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194

claims back, thus yielding additional scope. Perhaps a patentee will
vaguely describe her invention in the claims or in order to introduce
uncertainty about the scope of her patent. Perhaps (in the absence of
a meaningful estoppel rule) the patentee will accede to changes imposed by the PTO, but later seek to “undo” such acts during litigation.
The common thread here is that the patentee is failing to provide information relevant to the evaluation of her patent grant, thus creating
or exacerbating the “incomplete information” problem that so much
195
of the patent administration system seeks to solve.
4. Penalizing Underproduction
As noted above, the modern patent administration system contains the essential features of what Ayres and Gertner suggest is strategic behavior that results in incomplete information. Thus, the appropriate response is the penalty default rule of prosecution history
estoppel: to the extent that patentees underproduce information
when applying for a patent, they will incur penalty costs relating to the
information that they are forced to provide by the prosecution process. Thus, amendments, arguments, or clarifications relating to various aspects of patentability—claim scope, relationship between the invention and the prior art, the meaning of particular claim terms, and
196
clarity of disclosure—should (and under Festo VII, will) impose pen197
alties on patentees. As Ayres and Gertner suggest, however, these
194

In some ways, the patent prosecution process looks like a negotiation session
between the patentee/applicant and the examiner. To this end, note that studies have
shown that negotiators that adopt aggressive or even extreme opening positions
achieve more of their goals. See, e.g., Jerome M. Chertkoff & Melinda Conley, Opening
Offer and Frequency of Concession as Bargaining Strategies, 7 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 181 (1967) (explaining an empirical study supporting this proposition);
Grant T. Savage et al., Considering Both Relationships and Substance when Negotiating Strategically, in LEWICKI ET AL., NEGOTIATION: READINGS, EXERCISES, AND CASES 63 (2d ed.
1993) (explaining the results of a study on negotiation strategies that depending on
the positions of the parties); Tutzauer, Bargaining Outcome, Bargaining Process, and the
Role of Communication, 10 PROGRESS IN COMM. SCI. 257 (1991) (explaining why this
might be so); Laurie Weingart et al., Tactical Behaviors and Negotiation Outcomes, 1 INT’L
J. OF CONFLICT MGMT. 7 (1990); see also Lyon v. Boh, 1 F.2d 48, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)
(Hand, J.) (“[T]he antlike persistency of [patent] solicitors has overcome, and I suppose will continue to overcome, the patience of examiners, and there is apparently always but one outcome.”), rev’d, 10 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1926).
195
See supra Part II (describing the patent administration system’s goal of collecting information).
196
Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1835 (2002).
197
See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 94-95 (noting the importance of the ability to “contract around” default rules).
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penalties are only the default condition; patentees can avoid them by
producing the necessary information.
Such penalty-avoidance tactics might include narrowing original
claim language to comport better with limits established by prior art
and the disclosure requirements—thus avoiding the necessity of
198
amendment or argument during prosecution.
Patentees might define terms in their claims more clearly, so as to avoid costly misunderstandings with the PTO regarding their scope. Alternatively, patentees might provide additional teachings in their patent document,
thereby providing support for the breadth of claims desired. There
are certainly many more possibilities, all of which direct patentees to
carefully consider the standards of patentability at the time of application and provide the PTO (and thus the public) with the informational tools needed to properly evaluate the patent—thus serving the
policy goals of addressing the incomplete information problem.
There are likely to be a number of objections to a theory of prose199
cution history estoppel as a default penalty rule.
Costs. First, there is a class of arguments related to the perceived
status quo of the patent prosecution process. These arguments suggest that the costs “imposed” by the default penalty rule will substan200
tially diminish access to the patent system. And yet these contentions
fall under their own weight: a default penalty rule would clearly
change the cost analysis for a patentee, and thus change the status
201
quo of patent prosecution. But the default penalty rule is just that—

198

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2000) (establishing the prior art limitations); 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (establishing the disclosure requirements). This suggestion, of
course, implies a prior art search.
199
Judge Linn of the Federal Circuit has clearly been the most effective and articulate voice against the strong form of prosecution history estoppel. E.g., Festo VI, 234
F.3d at 620-30 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the
complete bar rule).
200
See id. at 624 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he majority’s new rule will substantially increase the cost of obtaining patent protection . . . .”).
201
For these reasons, I agree with Judge Linn that prospective patentees would
have to very carefully consider the costs and benefits of (a) seeking the earliest possible
filing date, perhaps at the cost of necessitating later amendment of the claims (and
thus the penalty default rule), see id. at 622 (arguing that an early filing will increase
chances of claim amendments); (b) avoiding a comprehensive prior art search, thus
increasing the possibility that an inventor would be surprised by prior art discovered by
the PTO, see id. at 624 (arguing that an inventor might not know of all relevant prior
art until prosecution); and (c) offering original claims that are relatively vague and
ambiguous, requiring later clarification, see id. at 622-24 (arguing that clarifying claim
amendments are often necessary). Over the long term, prosecution history estoppel as
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a default—and prospective patentees would have the option of deciding whether to reduce the costs and accept the possible default rule
202
penalty, or seek ways to avoid the penalty. And questions of cost location beg the question of why the public should subsidize the pro203
duction of such information, especially when it appears that the
prospective patentee is in the best position to cheaply produce it.
Literalism. A second group of arguments contend that the penalty
default rule is inappropriate in the particularities of the patent context. Thus, the argument would follow, the “inherent limitations of
204
language” would mean that the fit between the patent claim and the
actual invention would be inexact, necessitating both a scope of
205
“equivalents” and allowance for multiple claim amendments.
This
argument too is unconvincing. There is no question that claim draft206
ing is a difficult and imprecise business. And yet the statute and
207
public policy demand that such imprecision (which is, of course, just
another version of incomplete information) be reduced as much as
possible. And thus if the policy goal is one of reducing the “limitations of language” to a minimum, the patentee is clearly in the best
possible position to do so, either by carefully drafting precise claims in
the first instance, or by drafting any amended claims to cover the full
permissible scope of the invention, obviating resort to equivalents altogether. In other words, the penalty default rule operates here to
encourage crisp and considered drafting of both original and amended
a default penalty rule will undoubtedly impact the behavior of prospective patentees.
But that’s the point; as noted above, patentees are making strategic choices respecting
the production of valuable information related to patentability. The purpose of a
penalty default rule is to force them to consider the costs of such strategic choices.
202
See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 112-13 (noting that parties will
choose strategically whether to avoid penalty default rules); see also supra note 89 and
accompanying text (describing ways to avoid prosecution history estoppel).
203
See infra Part III.B. (discussing the prosecution externality).
204
Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 621 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205
Indeed, this appears to be the basic objection to the Festo VI rule voiced by the
Supreme Court. See Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1841 (2002) (“[T]here is no more reason
for holding the patentee to the literal terms of an amended claim than there is for
abolishing the doctrine of equivalents altogether and holding every patentee to the
literal terms of the patent.”).
206
See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2000) (requiring “clarity” and “precision” in claim
language).
207
See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 10, at 732-33 (endorsing Merges’s arguments);
Merges, supra note 12, at 2664 (noting the advantages of using property rules for patents). But see Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH L. REV. 985, 986-89 (1999) (arguing for less-clear rules to avoid the
market effects of an absolute right to exclude).
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claims: in original claims to avoid later amendments and in amended
claims to minimize the potential loss from imposition of the prosecution history estoppel penalty. Thus, objections to the default penalty
rule based on the nature of “language” are simply unavailing.
Imperfect Information. An argument related to literalism is that, despite her efforts, the patentee simply cannot achieve perfect information about the context of her invention. For example, a particularly
important piece of prior art may only become available after the application has been filed, or it may be impossible to foresee the full implications of a scope-reducing claim amendment. Thus, patentees
may be penalized by the default penalty rule despite taking steps
(such as informing themselves) to avoid it. The answer to this concern is to understand that costs related to imperfect information exist
whether we impose them on the patentee or the wider public. Thus
the operative question is how best to allocate the cost, by considering
which of the parties involved is best positioned to reduce the costs as
much as possible. As I have suggested above, the patentee is clearly in
the best position to deal with the production of information related to
208
the invention. Thus allocating the cost of imperfect information to
the patentee will ensure that it is minimized, and avoid costly and uncertain ex post evaluations of whether the patentee could have or
209
should have produced the missing information.
Information Reduction. A fourth important objection to prosecution history estoppel as a default penalty rule is that it will not actually
produce the additional information desired. There are various arguments in this regard. First, the default penalty rule will likely diminish
the willingness of patentees to provide information via claim amendments, thus resulting, perhaps, in a choice between claims that have
been given no context by the patentee versus claims that, as amended,
210
contain more information.
Second, a predictable response of pat-

208

See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing costs and how patentees can avoid them).
209
Thus, it is not an answer to suggest that the effect of estoppel should be limited
to cases where the patentee could “foresee” the scope-reducing effects of an amendment. But see Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1049 (arguing in favor of a foreseeability rule). Such a rule does not guarantee that the cost of imperfect information would
be thoroughly minimized, as the patentee is only required to consider what might be
“reasonable.” Further, the foreseeability rule imposes significant ex post decisionmaking costs—in determining what sorts of things were “foreseeable” under particular
circumstances.
210
See Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 626 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Paradoxically, the scope and meaning of claim limitations may be more easily
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entees will be to file a greater number of narrower claims, so as to preserve as many original claims (and thus achieve as much scope as pos211
sible).
Yet again these objections miss the mark. As to the first, one important feature of the default penalty rule is to encourage the production of relevant information at the outset of prosecution; there are
clear incentives already in place to provide relevant information (if
needed) during prosecution—the patent would be rejected otherwise.
And one suspects that the importance of avoiding amendments will
result in, if anything, more argument (i.e., information) of value. Furthermore, that amended claims provide additional information is obvious; the real question is how to interpret that information. The default penalty rule of prosecution history estoppel interprets such
information as ruling out the extension of the doctrine of equivalents;
alternative rules turn the additional information into yet another co212
nundrum.
As to the second objection noted above, the filing of many narrowly drawn claims instead of fewer, broader ones would seem to be
socially beneficial. By carefully defining the invention in several different ways, the patentee is obviously more likely to accurately describe the appropriate scope of invention. Thus, such claims will provide the public with more information, not less: as better-drawn claims,
213
they will require less resort to the doctrine of equivalents (and may
214
have less room in which to engage equivalents anyway).

discerned for amended limitations, as compared with originally drafted claim
limitations, based on the record developed during prosecution.”).
211
See id. at 624 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
the Festo rule would increase costs of prosecution because patentees would have to file
numerous narrow claims instead of fewer broader ones).
212
See id. at 628 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (conceding
that determining the scope of equivalents under pre-Festo VI rules was “arduous” and
“difficult and complex”); see also id. at 574-75 (“Our decision to reject the flexible bar
approach . . . comes after nearly twenty years of experience [applying the rule] . . . .
[I]t is virtually impossible to predict before the decision on appeal where the line of
surrender is drawn.”).
213
The idea here is that as literal claim language approaches the “correct” scope
of the invention—that scope which accurately reflects the innovation disclosed in the
patent, and avoids entanglement with the prior art—the importance of the doctrine of
equivalents fades. Cf. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
607-09 (1950) (explaining the doctrine of equivalents); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 330, 341-42 (1853) (noting the need to grant the patentee the scope of the
innovation, irrespective of a strict reading of claim language).
214
As the literal language of the claim approaches the boundaries established by
the prior art (and obvious variants thereof), there will necessarily be less room for the
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Problems with the PTO. Another significant objection to the default
penalty approach to prosecution history estoppel is that it assumes
that the PTO will respond properly to the additional information.
That is, even given the appropriate information, the PTO might inappropriately reject claims, potentially replacing the “default” rules with
“de facto” rules. (This is especially true given incentives within the
PTO, where examiners are given administrative “credit” for imposing
215
initial rejections, and then allowing the patent to issue.) Conversely,
in a regime where amendments are more costly in terms of patent
scope, patentees would more vigorously press the PTO to issue unamended claims, perhaps resulting in the granting of overly broad
claims. Here again, the incentives will help ensure that the patentee
seeks redress for inappropriate rejections, perhaps via appeals to the
Federal Circuit, and will increase the opportunity for discipline and
standardization. Concerns about inappropriate allowances are valid;
however, I am skeptical of whether the failings of the PTO in this particular area justify removing or reducing the beneficial incentives of
the penalty default rule. To the extent that a default penalty approach highlights problems with the PTO itself, then it suggests in216
creasing incentives to fix it.
217
In its incentive-producing role, prosecution history estoppel is
218
perhaps best viewed as an information-forcing default penalty rule.
By imposing a penalty of limiting patent scope, the rule encourages
patentees to take information-producing (and thus socially beneficial)
steps to avoid the penalty. Under such a view, prosecution history estoppel becomes an important tool for the reform of the patent prosecution process, a subject to which I now turn.
doctrine of equivalents to operate. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to capture subject matter in the prior art).
215
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 99, at 1496 n.3 (describing the internal administrative incentives for examiners); see also Merges, supra note 5, at 590 (discussing the incentive structure within the PTO as it relates to the increased volume of patent applications).
216
Of course, I am aware that PTO reform is necessarily prospective in nature, and
thus this argument does not address the plight of pending patents that may have been
harmed by past bad practices at the PTO. This is clearly of concern, though as I have
noted in Part I above, the real effects are likely to be quite small. Supra notes 89-99
and accompanying text.
217
As opposed to its information-producing role. See generally supra Part II (discussing information provided by prosecution history estoppel).
218
See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 97 (“[T]hrough the process of ‘contracting around’ penalty default rules, information is revealed to parties both inside
and outside of the contract.”).
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B. The Prosecution Externality
As I suggested in the Part above, the patent prosecution system offers a number of possibilities for strategic behavior on the part of pat219
entees with respect to information disclosure.
Thus, prosecution
history estoppel—an information-forcing penalty default rule—provides an important tool for countering the incentives to behave strategically.
In this Part, I want briefly to sketch a related but distinct argument: that a rule of prosecution history estoppel can help minimize
what I describe as the “prosecution externality,” a series of costs that
patentees impose upon society as a result of underproducing relevant
information. That is, in its incentive-creation role, prosecution history
estoppel can force patentees to internalize additional informational
costs related to patent administration—justifying the rule either in
economic or distributional terms.
The argument here is straightforward and builds substantially
upon points made above. An externality is a social cost of a particular
activity that is not taken into consideration by the creator of that
220
In the patent administration context, patentees have little incost.
centive (absent prosecution history estoppel, of course) to provide full
information related to the relationship between their innovation,
their disclosure, and the appropriate scope of their patent, given
221
This information is costly—or perhaps
standards of patentability.
even impossible—to produce absent full participation by the pat222
entee.
Thus, this information cost—which includes both the costs
of actually producing the information plus the costs of uncertainty or
error that accrue as a result of missing or inaccurate information—is
223
borne by the public, first in the form of the PTO and later by the
public more generally. Thus the observation of the prosecution externality: significant informational costs of patent prosecution are not con219

See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (explaining this).
See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 627-28
(3d ed. 1995) (describing externalities and their effect on the marketplace).
221
As I noted in Part III above, these concerns include: disincentives to conduct
thorough (or, indeed, any) prior art searches; disincentives to draft original claims to
avoid prior art; and disincentives to draft original claims so as to comport well with §
112 disclosure requirements. Supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
222
See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text (discussing certain types of information that are uniquely in the possession of the patentee).
223
The PTO is tasked with evaluating patent applications in light of patentability
standards, and issuing patents that are deemed compliant. See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2000)
(establishing the duties of the Patent Commissioner).
220
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sidered by patentees, thus the costs are borne by society rather than
being reflected in the cost-benefit calculation of the patentee.
Consider the hypothetical example of a prospective patentee who
files an application generally disclosing a device used for personal
transportation. As might be expected, there are a great number of
similar devices in the prior art. The patentee, however, has little incentive (absent prosecution history estoppel) to conduct a prior art
224
search and to tailor her claims accordingly; thus, she originally
claims “a personal transportation device with a plurality of wheels and
a means for locomotion”—a claim that is both unpatentable under
the prior art, and is well beyond the scope of her disclosure, which reveals a rather specific type of five-wheeled machine with a small electric motor. Assume that is it likely that the invention is patentable, if
the claims are drawn to “a personal transportation device with five
wheels and a small electric motor.”
In adopting this strategy of prosecution, which is perfectly legal
and rational—absent a meaningful application of the doctrine of
equivalents, the patentee has failed to consider several important
costs. First, the PTO will have to conduct an extensive prior art
search, evaluating the relevant prior art in light of the original
225
claims. Second, the PTO will have to consider the relationship between the proposed claims and the disclosure, determining whether
those of ordinary skill would be able to practice the invention given
226
the disclosure and whether those of ordinary skill would understand
227
Each of
that the patentee was in possession of the information.
these inquiries has significant costs in terms of time and/or error
228
rate. Costs in time relate to the opportunity cost of the assigned examiner working on another application. Costs in terms of error rate
refers to the costs incurred by society when invalid patents are issued

224

Supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
Note here that the broader the original claims, the broader the scope of the
prior art search-–and thus the more costly and time-consuming.
226
See supra note 127 (introducing the enablement requirement).
227
See supra note 128 (introducing the written description requirement).
228
The breadth of the “gap” between the original claim and what meets the standards of patentability is unquestionably related to the costs incurred by the PTO.
Thus, while the PTO will conduct such evaluations in any case, it is unquestionable
that circumstances where the proposed language is markedly distinct from that which
would comport with the standards of patentability will be especially costly–-perhaps in
a nonlinear relationship. For example, as I observed in note 225 above, broader original claims will result in a much greater search scope, and a correspondingly greater
task to identify prior art truly relevant to the patentable scope of the claims.
225
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229

by the PTO.
In neither case will these costs be adequately considered (if at all) by our prospective patentee—absent some incentive
230
mechanism to do so.
A robust conception of prosecution history estoppel provides incentives for the patentee to internalize these information costs; by
producing information related to the context of the innovation, disclosing adequately, and claiming appropriately, the patentee can
avoid the prospect of scope-limiting claim amendments or clarifica231
tions. Such internalization is likely to be economically efficient, as it
232
will result in less underproduction of the critical information.
Note of course, that a view of prosecution history estoppel as addressing the prosecution externality is imperfect, as a more direct way
to achieve this internalization of the costs would be via direct regulation. For example, legislation or regulation could affirmatively require prior art searches by patentees, claim language might be ren233
dered unchangeable during the prosecution process, and so forth.

229

Lemley argues that the costs resulting from the issue of invalid patents are
likely to be less than the costs required to have the PTO avoid all errors. Lemley, supra
note 99, at 1149. Lemley’s point is that only some of the invalid patents will be important to the marketplace, and thus only those few will require the ex ante costs of litigation to invalidate them; however, Lemley compares the costs of production of the relevant information as compared to the costs of litigation. Id. at 1501-08. Here, the
argument is that the (likely lower) costs of production by the patentees themselves better
achieves the goal of providing the relevant information to the marketplace. Admittedly, to the extent that the patentee either does not have, or cannot efficiently develop the information, then Lemley’s point becomes more salient.
In any event, it can scarcely be argued that the issue of invalid patents has some
negative effect on society. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 5, at 210 (criticizing the issue of
potentially invalid patents).
230
Indeed, as I argued above, supra note 193 and accompanying text, the patentee
may consider this cost-shifting to be a great benefit of the present patent system, allowing strategic behavior in the prosecution process to supplement or replace actual inventive activity.
231
See supra note 198 and accompanying text (advancing similar arguments).
232
See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 220, at 626-28 (discussing the benefits of
reducing externalities). An argument might be made that this will result in less patenting behavior generally. That is, if the risk-return calculation on the costs of seeking a
patent includes the benefit (to the patentee) of avoiding these information costs, then
the patentee is more likely to seek a patent than in the case where the costs must be
recognized. This is a valid concern, but simply points out the question of whether the
additional costs to the patentee will dissuade meritorious patenting to a degree that
outpaces the costs to society resulting from the externality. This seems quite unlikely:
the costs of obtaining a patent, even under a prosecution history estoppel regime, are
likely to be far less than the returns from a commercially successful patent.
233
This is much like the requirement that no “new matter” may be added to a
pending patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2000).
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In contrast, under the prosecution history estoppel framework, the
patentee would be offered the choice of internalizing the information
costs or accepting the patent scope costs that accrue from prosecution
history estoppel. Thus, the prosecution history estoppel rule is only
an approximation of the more direct method—whether it operates as
effectively would depend upon the relative costs of information production and loss of scope. In cases where information production
costs dominate any potential loss of scope, patentees may choose to
continue to externalize such costs and vice-versa—though at least forcing the consideration of such costs is likely to be useful. Accordingly,
from an economic perspective, the view of prosecution history estoppel as an information-forcing default rule is likely to be better.
But there may be substantial distributional justifications for viewing prosecution history estoppel as addressing the prosecution subsidy. That is, society may consider it unfair that patentees are allowed
to supplement the potential commercial rewards offered by the patent
234
system with the externalization of substantial information costs.
Thus, prosecution history estoppel, by reducing (if not entirely elimi235
nating ) the prosecution subsidy, may be instrumental in righting the
236
balance struck between inventors and society.
C. Enforcing Institutional Arrangements
A third compelling view of prosecution history estoppel in its incentive-creation role is one where the rule is instrumental in maintaining and enforcing the respective roles of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office and the federal judiciary. This argument suggests
that prosecution history estoppel, by elevating the stakes in the PTO’s
decision-making process, will result in better discipline of the Office
in its patent administration function.
The patent administration system establishes the PTO as, essen237
The standards, howtially, the initial arbiter of validity standards.

234

See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 5, at 209 (criticizing patents as tools of large corporations to exclude competitors).
235
See supra note 233 and accompanying text (explaining why prosecution history
estoppel is not the same as directly requiring internalization).
236
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989) (discussing the “careful balance” between inventors and society).
237
See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2000) (establishing the duties of the Patent Commissioner);
see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999) (discussing the administrative role
of the PTO); Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
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ever, are those established by Congress, as interpreted by the Federal
Courts—especially the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
238
Thus the patent administration system establishes an adCircuit.
ministrative hierarchy: the PTO’s decisions to either deny or grant a
239
patent are reviewable by the courts.
Accordingly, because the standards are established by the judiciary
(largely via their interpretation of Congressional enactments), it may
be inefficient if the PTO was operating under validity standards that
were markedly different from those established by the judiciary. Lemley has argued, however, that the costs of detailed validity determinations for all patents is greater than the costs of determination via liti240
gation for those few patents that matter in the marketplace.
His
argument thus suggests that disciplining the PTO may not be cost effective. Here, however, I discuss the value of disciplining the PTO
primarily in its decisions to reject patents (or particular claim language). That is, the cost of a widely divergent PTO is not simply that
too many patents are issued, but that too few patents are issued as well.
That is, an error-prone PTO increases the variance in decision making,
not merely the quantity of inappropriately issued patents. Thus, because a strong prosecution history estoppel rule will create strong incentives for patentees whose patents (or particular claim language)
have been rejected to appeal those rejections to the judiciary, the
PTO’s decision-making processes can be better disciplined. Further,
such an argument comports as well with Lemley’s observations, as the
241
patentee will be in the best position to calculate the cost-benefit of
fighting any particular rejection—with the alternative perhaps being
the amendment of the claim (and the consequent loss of scope via

1415, 1441 (1995) (arguing that the PTO should be given more deference in decisions
by the Federal Circuit).
238
The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under
the patent law, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000), as well as appeals directly from the PTO, 35
U.S.C. § 141 (2000).
239
Factual findings made by the PTO in the course of prosecution will be reviewed
under a “substantial evidence” standard by the Federal Circuit on direct appeal. In re
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Any deference to the PTO during
other challenges to its decision making (via litigation) is likely encompassed in the
presumption of validity that attaches to each issued patent, thus requiring “clear and
convincing” evidence to prove invalidity.
240
Lemley, supra note 99, at 1497.
241
In as good a position as anyone at the time, though perhaps not in as good a
position as the patentee might be later in time. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 10, at 715
(noting that parties are likely to become better informed as time passes regarding the
value of any particular patent).
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prosecution history estoppel). Without a robust conception of prosecution history estoppel, the consequences of PTO rejections are reduced; a patentee might amend a claim and yet recover the appropri242
ate scope via the doctrine of equivalents.
Another possible reason to believe that enhancing the importance
of PTO decision making is valuable is that the PTO examiners have a
relative advantage over the federal courts in the technical qualifications to make the sorts of detailed factual determinations about validity that are required. That is, the PTO possesses unique technological
capabilities that the courts simply cannot match, yet the courts are
endowed with the legal authority to determine the validity standards.
Accordingly, the best system-wide solution may be to maintain the
courts in their roles as interpreters of legal standards to be used by the
PTO and to maximize the use of the PTO’s specific technological resources to evaluate inventions against those standards. This is
achieved by channeling review of PTO decision making to direct appeals, rather than indirect review of validity during enforcement ac243
tions.
As this Part has demonstrated, a robust conception of prosecution
history estoppel produces socially beneficial incentives that effectively
tailor parties’ behavior within the patent administration system—
whether as information-forcing default penalty rules, ways of reducing
the prosecution eternality, or as a tool to discipline the institutional arrangements of the U.S. patent administration system. Even though
the existence—and value—of such a role has been largely ignored in
the literature, there remains an extant question (that has been de242

See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1477 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (noting, under the pre-Festo VI rules of prosecution history estoppel, that the
patentee was estopped only against the subject matter disclosed in the prior art cited
against it.)
243
This argument is perhaps more directly in contradistinction to Lemley’s costrelated arguments. See Lemley, supra note 99, at 1501 (discussing a study of the costs
and benefits of the PTO’s additional screening). Here, I note that any complete discussion of relative cost must include the costs of erroneous decisions to deny patentability (and their subsequent impact on the system as a whole). See generally Richard A.
Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091,
2097 (1997) (noting the importance of clear rights in property to stimulate investment—both in property and in areas unpropertized); Kieff, supra note 10, at 720-21
(“[W]e typically look to clear and enforceable boundaries in property rights to provide
incentives for investment while at the same time giving clearance to non-infringing activities.”). Once the cost of variance is factored in, Lemley’s question regarding
whether it is more efficient for decision making to occur in the PTO versus litigation
becomes closer, as the cost of variance will be far less in the more technologically
adept PTO (assuming the production of relevant information, of course).
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bated at length in the literature and, especially, the jurisprudence)
regarding the value of a strong form of prosecution history estoppel as
compared to less rigid alternatives. As I suggest in the following Part,
the selection of the strong form of estoppel has substantial relative
benefits.
IV. CHOOSING ESTOPPEL: CLARIFYING THE DEBATE ABOUT FORM
This Article has demonstrated that the conventional wisdom
about prosecution history estoppel is incomplete, and that prosecution history estoppel serves important roles in the patent administration system as both an information-producing and incentive-creating
rule. This more comprehensive theory of prosecution history estoppel can be applied to the recent debates over what form of estoppel
rule (that is, the scope-affect when the doctrine is triggered) comports
best with the goals of the patent system. Reconsidering estoppel as information-producing and incentive-creating leads directly to the conclusion that a strong form of estoppel—a rule that significantly,
244
clearly, and predictably affects patent scope when triggered —is the
dominant option. The application of the strong form of prosecution
history estoppel would result in the elimination of access to the doc245
trine of equivalents as to the amended/clarified claim language.
The primary alternative to the strong form of estoppel is what the
Federal Circuit in Festo VI called the “flexible bar.” Under a flexible
bar scheme, the scope of the estoppel (that is, the scope-affect) would
vary substantially depending on the particular circumstances. As such,
the flexible bar rule leads to several “sub-rules” that set out how to
evaluate which circumstances call for what kind of scope-affect. In the
pre-Festo Federal Circuit doctrine, the analysis considered what one of
ordinary skill in the art would have concluded from the prosecution
246
history; accordingly, depending upon the particular facts of the
244

Thus the rule (though not the reasoning), see supra note 6 (discussing the majority’s reasoning), established by the majority of the en banc Federal Circuit in Festo VI
is correct. See Festo VI, 234 F.3d 558, 571-74 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing the
forms of the rule).
245
See Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 574-75 (describing the complete bar rule). Note that in
the Festo VI decision, the court discussed only the application of prosecution history
estoppel to claim amendments (as opposed to other information, such as arguments);
thus the discussion that follows is necessarily focused on claim amendments. However,
the argument for the strong form here would apply to all prosecution history information, whether gleaned from express claim amendments or not.
246
E.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“[T]he standard for determining whether subject matter has been relinquished is
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247

case, the effect of estoppel could be “from great to small to zero.”
Another example of the flexible form of estoppel is the “foreseeable
248
Under
bar” rule proposed by Conigliaro, Greenberg, and Lemley.
the foreseeable bar rule, the limiting effect of the rule would be that
which was foreseeable to a reasonable patentee at the time of the
249
claim amendment. A third (and potentially most significant) appliwhether one of ordinary skill in the art would objectively conclude from the prosecution history that an applicant surrendered it.” (citing Mark I Mktg. Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 66 F.3d 285, 291 (Fed. Cir. 1995))).
Note that the entire analysis of prosecution history estoppel has long been understood to be an issue for the court to decide, despite its clearly factual nature. See
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997) (noting
that prosecution history estoppel is a question of law).
247
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see,
e.g., Litton, 140 F.3d at 1456 (taking a limited view of the surrendered subject matter);
Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1555-56 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (taking a more liberal view); 5A CHISUM, supra note 23, § 18.05[3][b][ii]
(collecting cases).
248
Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1048. Note that this test is different from the
“foreseeability” factor discussed by the Court in Festo VII. See infra note 253 (contrasting the Conigliaro, Greenberg, and Lemley “foreseeability” test with that of the Supreme Court in Festo VII); see also Darius C. Gambino & Richard A. Paikoff, A New
Weapon for Alleged Infringers?: “Patent Drafter Estoppel” Explored, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 469
(2001) (discussing foreseeability as a principle in the patent law); Andrew C. Greenberg & Jeffery R. Kuester, The “Palsgraffing” of Patent Law: Foreseeability and the Doctrine of
Equivalents, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, June 1998, at 17 (same).
249
See Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1048 (discussing the “foreseeable bar” as a
mid-ground between “flexible” and “absolute” bars). Thus, the proposed “foreseeable
bar” rule responds to the argument made by Judge Rader in his dissent in Festo VI: that
the “complete bar rule” would inappropriately limit coverage of later-developed (i.e.,
unforeseeable) technology, which he believes is the animating force behind the doctrine of equivalents. Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 619-20 (Rader, J., dissenting); see also Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1070 & n.90 (citing Judge Rader’s dissent to support criticism of the absolute bar).
It is not at all clear, however, how this foreseeable bar is any different in effect
from the Federal Circuit’s pre-Festo “flexible bar.” In the paradigmatic claim amendment case, the flexible bar requires analysis of what subject matter one of ordinary skill
in the art would have considered to have been “surrendered” by an amendment. See
supra notes 246-47 (introducing the standard). This proposed “foreseeable bar” evaluates whether a “reasonable patentee” (i.e., one of ordinary skill in the art) would have
foreseen a particular limiting effect of a claim amendment. See Conigliaro et al., supra
note 8, at 1048 (discussing the foreseeable bar). But what one of ordinary skill in the
art would have considered to have been surrendered is the same as what one of ordinary skill in the art would have foreseen as the limiting effect of the amendment. That
is, there is no meaningful analytic distinction between evaluating whether the same person (one of ordinary skill in the art) would have: (a) understood subject matter X to
have been surrendered; and (b) foreseen that the amendment would limit coverage of
(or, “surrender”) subject matter X. In both cases, the analysis devolves to a complex,
multifaceted evaluation of the understanding of one of skill in the art, the particularities of the amendment, and the subject matter involved. See, e.g., id. at 1060-61 (criti-
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cation of the flexible bar is the Supreme Court’s “presumptive bar”
250
rule established in Festo VII. Under this scheme, the application of
prosecution history estoppel will presumptively eliminate access to
251
equivalents. This presumption does not apply, however, “where the
amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular
252
equivalent.” The Court posits examples of the unreasonable limitation of equivalents:
(a) whether the equivalent was “unforeseeable at the time of the
253
application”;
cizing the complexity and uncertainty in the Federal Circuit’s flexible bar scheme).
Conigliaro, Greenberg, and Lemley argue that the foreseeable bar is distinct
from the flexible bar because its test is “more predictable.” Id. at 1071. And yet the
argument fails to convince. They acknowledge their foreseeability test is uniquely “fact
specific,” id. at 1072, and do not identify any specific factor in the traditional flexible
bar analysis that would not be present, cf. id. at 1072-73 (criticizing the factors involved
in the Federal Circuit’s version of the flexible bar).
Even assuming that the proposed foreseeable bar and the pre-Festo status quo are
different, there is good reason to believe that a foreseeable bar in the form suggested
by Conigliaro, Greenberg, and Lemley might be considerably less useful than even the
Federal Circuit’s flexible bar approach. That is because the introduction of an explicit
“foreseeable” factor renders the analysis circular. That is, whether one of ordinary skill
would “foresee” the limiting effect of a claim amendment involves both factual and
legal components. For example, in a regime where one of ordinary skill in the art understands the “rules of the game” with respect to prosecution, any foreseeability analysis will thus be subject to then-existing legal construct. A claim amendment made in
the backdrop of rules imposing little effect from prosecution history estoppel is going
to have a very different foreseeable effect than one made under stronger forms of the
rules. Thus, the foreseeability effect of a claim amendment is quite unlike the tort
doctrine of “foreseeability” where the analysis involves purely factual scenarios. E.g.,
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (noting that “proximate
cause” in the tort sense depends “in each case upon many considerations”); ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 367-69 (1st ed. 1988) (discussing the
efficiency of the Palsgraf rule in torts); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND ECONOMICS 39-51 (2d ed. 1989) (same). In the prosecution history estoppel
context, foreseeability is constructed, and thus self-references are especially problematic.
250
122 S. Ct. 1831, 1842 (2002).
251
See id. at 1842. (“[W]e hold here that the patentee should bear the burden of
showing that the amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question.”).
252
Id.
253
Id. The specification that the time of the application (rather than the time of
the amendment) is the key date is significant, and seems to undermine the Court’s defense of the presumptive bar. First, note that these two dates—the date of application
and the date of the claim amendment—could potentially be years apart (especially
given the common use of continuation practice before the PTO). Thus there will potentially be a large “gap” in foreseeability, especially in rapidly developing technologies. Yet irrespective of when the amendment is entered, or the rate of technological
progress post-application (what if a major breakthrough in the field occurs between
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(b) where the rationale underlying the amendment bears no
254
more than a “tangential relation to the equivalent in question”; and
(c) “some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not
reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute
255
in question.”
A close examination of the Court’s presumptive bar reveals that it,
like the foreseeable bar, is little different from the pre-Festo Federal
Circuit doctrine. First, the “presumption” appears to be largely content-free: in a deeply troubling omen for the consistent and predictable application of this new rule, the Court did not address what
256
quantum of evidence might rebut the presumption.
Might inferences coupled with attorney argument be sufficient? Or boilerplate
language placed in the file by the patentee—to the effect that no
257
equivalents were expected to be surrendered? One can expect that
whether the patentee has overcome the “presumption” will largely

application and amendment?), the patentee can avoid estoppel on the basis of (and
thus assert infringement by equivalents against) subject matter not “foreseeable” at the
earlier time of the patent application. This would seem to undermine the Court’s argument that its rule properly accounts for the understanding of the patentee during
prosecution. See id. (“[C]ourts may presume the amended text was composed with
awareness of this rule and that the territory surrendered is not an equivalent to the territory claimed.”). Further, the rule would seem to encourage delaying tactics during
prosecution—to increase the “foreseeability” advantage noted above.
Note also that this “foreseeabilty” test is somewhat different from that advocated
by Conigliaro, Greenberg, and Lemley. See Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1069
(“Under our proposed foreseeable bar, a court will apply the doctrine of equivalents
notwithstanding a claim amendment unless the limiting effect of the amended language with respect to an accused device would have been foreseeable at the time of the
amendment to a reasonable person skilled in the art.”). The Conigliaro, Greenberg,
and Lemley test analyzes the foreseeable effects of a particular amendment, while the
Supreme Court’s test analyzes whether the asserted equivalent itself was foreseeable.
Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1842. The former implicates a combined legal and factual analysis, while the latter is a question of technology.
254
Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1842. This example is targeted to what might be called
the “multidimensional surrender” problem for prosecution history estoppel. That is, if
a patentee originally claims “stainless steel screws,” and later amends to claim “stainless
steel nails” (to avoid covering stainless steel screws), a question might arise regarding
whether the patentee had surrendered, for example, bronze nails or bronze screws.
That is, in these cases it seems apparent that the patentee intended to amend (and
thus “surrender”) along one dimension—here, fastener type. But has the patentee
also surrendered along a second dimension—the type of material? Even as this very
simple example demonstrates, however, applying this particular example to real cases
is likely to be a significant challenge.
255
Id.
256
Id. (discussing factors that can rebut presumption of estoppel).
257
Of course, this ambiguity offers the Federal Circuit a degree of flexibility to tailor the rule appropriately. See infra Part V (discussing post-Festo VII strategies).
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depend upon the detailed factual circumstances surrounding the
258
amendment—i.e., virtually the same mode of analysis as pre-Festo.
Second, and even more tellingly, there is the Court’s third example of
an unreasonable limitation of equivalents: “any other reason” the
patentee might not have been reasonably expected to describe the
equivalent in question. This is, of course, an invitation to parties (and
courts) to “fill in the blanks” concerning the case-by-case propriety of
limiting equivalents, thus clarifying that the Court’s rule is (absent the
dubious burden-shift) little different from the Federal Circuit’s pre259
Festo flexible bar rules.
Thus, a review of the alternatives to the strong form of estoppel
demonstrates that each is fundamentally based on the wide-ranging,
deeply contextual, analysis of the flexible bar. And, as described below, under the theory of prosecution history estoppel outlined in this
Article, there are several reasons that the strong form of prosecution
history estoppel is the better choice.
A. Answering the Call: Prosecution History Estoppel and Patent Reform
The patent administration system is presently being strongly (and
generally deservedly) criticized, in particular for the perceived inabil260
ity of the PTO to properly evaluate patent applications.
The complaints are especially sharp in the context of new technologies, such as
computer software, business models or financial transactions, or bio261
technology. Such criticisms have resulted in a number of proposals
for reform, including a “moratorium” on patenting in certain tech262
263
nologies; the imposition of compulsory licenses; an affirmative re258

See supra notes 78, 246 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s
pre-Festo analysis).
259
Id.
260
For a sample of such criticism, see sources cited supra note 5.
261
See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 5, at 213 & n.111 (criticizing the expense of PTO
mistakes); Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 42-45 (2001) (“[S]ignificant deficits in the PTO’s ability to
examine software patent applications remain unaddressed.”); Merges, supra note 5, at
578-79 (criticizing patent administration involved with software and business methods).
262
See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 259 (proposing a moratorium on patents in software
and business models)
263
See, e.g., id. at 260 (suggesting the imposition of compulsory licenses); John H.
Barton, Reforming the Patent System, 287 SCI. 1933 (2001) (same); Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998) (discussing the problems inherent in the privatization of
biomedical research).
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quirement that patentees disclose all prior art they know or should
264
have known; the presumptive denial of patentability of certain “sus265
pect” inventions; and major reforms of the operations of the PTO
266
itself.
Many of these reform proposals come at significant costs: they
would radically alter the ability of inventors to seek patent protec267
tion; significantly change the basic incentives underlying the patent
268
269
system; or impose significant costs on the public treasury. And yet
the common intuition centers around the inadequacy of information:
the idea that the PTO and the public are inadequately informed
about these innovations, their context, and their scope. Thus, the
proposals to limit patentability reflect a deep distrust of the information-production process. For example, the proposals to offer compulsory licenses are merely a “back-end” way of addressing errors in
evaluation—and thus the failures of information production. Other
proposals seek to produce information more directly.
Once we recognize that much of the criticism (and recommendations) aimed at the present patent administration system is related to
inadequacy of information, then the strong form of prosecution history estoppel emerges as a crucially important tool of patent reform.
By operating as both an important source of information, and as a
powerful incentive to produce further information, a strong regime of
264

See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 5, at 260-61 (suggesting such a requirement).
See, e.g., Patent Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1333, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001).
266
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 99, at 1496 n.3 (discussing the costs of the PTO’s
additional screening); Merges, supra note 5, at 577 (describing problems with PTO operations).
267
The moratorium and presumptive denial proposals would diminish access to
the patent system for innovators in certain fields (in the specific cases cited above, the
fields of software and business models). Such a complete bar of access would obviously
harm the ability of researchers in these areas to marshal resources to invest in continued innovation and commercialization. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 10, at 703-04 (discussing the need for patents for commercialization).
268
Imposing a series of compulsory licenses would transform the patent system
into a liability regime, rather then a property regime. Cf. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (noting differences between property and liability
rules). However, Merges and Kieff have convincingly argued that the inability of relatively uninformed third parties such as courts to appropriately evaluate the costs and
benefits of commercialization in innovation strongly suggests that patents should remain as “property-like” as possible. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 10, at 733; Merges, supra
note 12, at 2664.
269
Reforming the PTO is a good idea, but is likely to be quite expensive. As noted
above, Lemley has questioned whether the costs of a thorough reform of the patent
system are justified. Lemley, supra note 99, at 1497.
265

234

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 151: 159

prosecution history estoppel will expand the production of informa270
tion. And yet such a rule will not have the significant costs attached
to it that other reform proposals feature: access to the patent system
will not be curtailed, patentee’s bargaining rights need not be re271
duced and no additional resources need to be expended by the public. Because the strong form of prosecution history estoppel forces
patentees to internalize (or at least to consider) the costs of underproduction of information, the rule supports a key criterion of the
function of patents as property rights: the view that private parties
with full information are best able to evaluate respective costs and
272
benefits. Thus, the imposition of a strong form of prosecution history estoppel is strongly justified on the basis of patent reform since
the additional production of information will address many of the
273
contemporary concerns about the patent administration system.
One final point is in order here. As should be obvious, even a
weaker version of prosecution history estoppel—such as the Federal
274
Circuit’s pre-Festo status quo —provides at least some incentives to
produce information; however, maintaining the status quo is not “reform.” In this Part, I am assuming that at least some of the criticisms
(i.e., those related to the incompleteness of information) are valid,
and am offering the strong form of prosecution history estoppel as a
potentially significant tool that will yield changes in the system.
B. Clarifying the Borders of Estoppel: Rules Versus Standards
A second major reason to favor a strong form of prosecution his275
tory estoppel is that it creates a rule rather than a standard. This is
270

See supra Parts II-III (noting the roles of prosecution history estoppel). As
noted above, supra text accompanying note 231, it is correct that strong forms of
prosecution history estoppel will lead to less amendment (and thus information expressed by amendment). Yet the incentives will also produce more information before
prosecution, and are likely to engender more argument between the prospective patentee and the PTO.
271
The scope of the patent grant may be reduced, of course, as a result of the
prosecution history. Supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
272
See, e.g., supra note 268 (discussing property rules versus liability rules).
273
Professor Kesan has suggested a number of additions and alterations to the
patent system directed at producing information for much the same reasons. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002).
274
See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1456 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (stating the pre-Festo VI rule). The “foreseeable bar” suggested by Conigliaro,
Greenberg, and Lemley would fit within this category as well. Conigliaro et al., supra
note 8, at 1045-49.
275
I refer here to the distinction between regulation via rules and regulation via
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not merely to suggest that a rule form will provide more notice to the
public relating to the scope of any particular patent—although that is
276
certainly true —but that the imposition of the rule-like strong form
of prosecution history estoppel will in itself be a better choice. I note
two considerations in this vein.
First, the imposition of a rule will greatly increase the incentives
that all parties have to learn and respond to the law. Specifically, a
strong form of prosecution history estoppel will result in rapid adjustment to the new rule, thus leading much more quickly and cer277
tainly to the benefits of prosecution history estoppel than would a
278
weaker form of the rule.

standards: “If we want to prevent driving at excessive speeds, one approach is to post
specific speed limits and to declare it unlawful per se to exceed those limits; another is
to eschew specific speed limits and simply declare that driving at unreasonable speeds
is unlawful.” Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257 (1974). In the prosecution history estoppel context, the
strong form has rule-like characteristics, while the weaker/flexible forms are standards.
The ongoing debate about the relative merits of “rules versus standards” has
generated a substantial literature. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 15-63 (1987) (outlining and critiquing the rules versus standards debate); Ian
Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts On Optimal Tailoring Of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIS.
L.J. 1 (1993) (describing the choice between rules and standards in the context of contracts); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65
(1983) (discussing rules versus standards in the administrative law context); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (providing
an economic analysis of the choice between rules and standards); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976)
(considering the “choice between rules and standards as the form for legal directives”);
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783-91 (1989)
(distinguishing between the instrumental and substantive conceptions of the rule of
law); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-93
(1988) (describing the differences between rules and standards); Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (explaining the dispute over rules versus
standards); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing the split within the Supreme Court over the choice between adopting rules or standards in constitutional
law).
276
See, e.g., Festo VI, 234 F.3d 558, 574-78 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (explaining
the notice function of the strong prosecution history estoppel rule); see also Kaplow,
supra note 275, at 621 (arguing that rules should govern more frequent conduct, as the
costs of rules in this context is likely to be less than the costs of standards because the
outcome of any question is more predictable).
277
See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (describing the effects of a
prosecution history estoppel rule).
278
See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 275, at 7-8 (commenting on the relative costs to individuals of rules versus standards); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules
and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 887-92 (1992) (describing how, under conditions of uncertainty and high costs of learning, parties will remain “rationally igno-
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Second, not only will the imposition of a rule for prosecution history estoppel greatly increase the means by which the public can as279
certain the scope of estoppel, it will also (and equally importantly)
substantially increase the confidence with which the concerned patentee can evaluate (and perhaps avoid) the penalty default costs of
prosecution history estoppel. That is, the clear rule of the strong form
of estoppel assists patentees in both determining the costs of modifying their behavior and realizing that such modifications will avoid the
costs of estoppel. By contrast, the weaker forms of estoppel provide at
best hints and conjectures—and more likely are ex ante indetermi280
nate —as to the consequences of any particular claim amendment or
clarification. In such cases, the choice of a clear rule will dominate
281
that of a complex standard.
There are, of course, costs associated with rules, and a strong form
of prosecution history estoppel is no exception. One obvious cost is
the distributional unfairness that the change to a strong form would
work on current patentees, who prosecuted their patents with at least
somewhat different expectations. As noted above, however, these
costs, while perhaps significant on an individual basis, are not likely to
282
be meaningful in the context of the patent system more generally.
Another (and potentially more important) cost is the potential diminishment in incentives to patent as a result of the additional costs incurred by patentees by a strong form of prosecution history estoppel.
These costs might take the form of the additional costs of developing
rant”); Kaplow, supra note 275, at 621 (noting the importance–-and costs–-of parties
learning the law).
279
This point is, of course, obvious, and is the primary ground upon which the
Federal Circuit justified the change to the strong form of estoppel. Festo VI, 234 F.3d at
577-78.
280
Neither the “flexible bar” rule nor the proposed “foreseeable bar” are ex ante
predictable—in part because each analysis requires determination of the particular
views of a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, a construct that will necessarily remain undefined until the Federal Circuit rules on the matter. But see Conigliaro
et al., supra note 8, at 1072 (arguing that the foreseeable bar is ex ante predictable because of the objective nature of the inquiry).
281
Here, a predictable response might be that the standard (i.e., the flexible
forms of the prosecution history estoppel rule) will also lead patentees to the behavior–additional disclosure-–that is the benefit of the strong form of estoppel. See supra
note 270 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of a prosecution history estoppel rule). In this case, however, the choice is even more clear: the compliance and
learning costs of the flexible form will swamp that of the strong form. In other words,
if the flexible form eventually yields patentees in the same position as the strong form,
then we might as well have the clearer, simpler, and cheaper rule.
282
See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (estimating that .03 percent of
patents would be affected).
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pre-prosecution information, hiring skillful patent drafters, adopting
more vigorous prosecution strategies, etc. This argument is valid—a
strong form of prosecution history estoppel will increase costs to patentees, and on the margin decrease the incentives produced by the
patent system. The question then, is whether this cost is justified by
the benefits that flow from the rule rather than the standard. As
noted at length above, the patentee is generally going to be the lowestcost producer of information concerning the context of his or her
283
Further, to the extent that the patentee-produced
own invention.
information is both more timely and more accurate than otherwise,
substantial benefits will accrue to the public because of better opera284
While this claim is obvition of the patent administration system.
ously contingent and subject to empirical testing, it seems clear that
the social harm from any marginal decrease in incentives as a result of
additional costs will be more than offset by the benefits flowing from
285
the strong form of estoppel.
C. Evidence of Failure: The Origins of Festo
A third—and yet perhaps no less important—reason to favor the
strong form of estoppel over the weaker forms is that the only significant evidence concerning the application of the weaker forms of
prosecution history estoppel points towards failure. In its Festo VI de-

283

See supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting that the patentee has access
to most of the information).
284
See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of patentee-provided information).
285
It might also be argued that the use of a rule here—that is, the strong form of
estoppel—will impose costs in cases where a prospective patentee is unable to foresee
the significance of the scope-reduction that results from an amendment. Yet even
where the patentee cannot anticipate the progress of technology (and thus cannot accurately determine the “cost” of scope-reduction ex ante), the nature of the effect—
the loss of scope, both of foreseeable and unforeseeable subject matter—is eminently
understandable, albeit not amenable to precise valuation. (In the patent context, of
course, precise ex ante valuations are unlikely in any event.) Therefore, the objection
related to “unforeseen” equivalents being excluded under a strong form of the rule is
no different than the objection to excluding foreseeable equivalents. While discussing
the fairness of their proposed foreseeable bar, Conigliaro, Greenberg, and Lemley
emphasize the importance of applying the doctrine of equivalents:
[W]here the limiting effect of an amendment’s language with respect to an
accused device could not have been objectively foreseen at the time of the
amendment[,] . . . refusing to apply the doctrine of equivalents unfairly deprives the patentee of protection that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
deemed essential to a meaningful right of exclusivity under the patent system.
Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1069.
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cision, the seven-member majority of the Federal Circuit noted that
the court’s “nearly twenty years” of experience with the flexible bar
286
Describing the
rule had convinced it that change was necessary.
287
flexible bar rule as “virtually unascertainable,” the court noted that
its experience had convinced it that it was “impossible . . . for the public or the patentee” to determine the scope of prosecution history es288
toppel. Thus, the court turned to the strong form of the rule—what
it called the “complete bar”—as an alternative.
The rejection of the flexible bar rule by the Federal Circuit is, I
suggest, significant for its own sake. First, there is no institution in a
better position to evaluate the success or failure of the prosecution
history estoppel rule than the Federal Circuit, which has the ultimate
289
responsibility for applying the rule. When evaluating whether a particular doctrinal rule is likely to function effectively, the views of the
judges charged with implementing it must be given significant
290
weight.
A second reason to take the Federal Circuit’s empirical conclusion
here quite seriously is that it moves against two linked trends in the
patent law (both of which are the product of the Federal Circuit itself): (a) a shift in the locus of decision making from juries to
291
judges; and (b) the increasing importance of Federal Circuit deci292
In contrast, the declaration that the flexible bar rule
sion making.
286

Festo VI, 234 F.3d 558, 574-75 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Our decision to reject the flexible bar approach . . . comes after nearly twenty years of experience in performing our role as the sole court of appeals for patent matters.”).
287
Id. at 577.
288
Id.
289
Prosecution history estoppel, and its application, is considered a matter of law.
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997).
290
Some have suggested, however, that such considerations should be given little
weight, as the Federal Circuit is itself anti-patent. See, e.g., Ayers, supra note 75, at 549
(arguing that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Festo is the culmination of a history of
anti-patent bias). Recent studies have not borne this out. See, e.g., Allison & Lemley,
supra note 100, at 240-44 (finding no bias on the part of individual judges); Donald A.
Dunner, A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR.
B.J. 151 (1995) (finding that the Federal Circuit is not biased in favor of or against
patents).
291
The paradigmatic example of this is claim construction. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that claim construction is an issue
reserved exclusively for the court). In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court appeared
affirmatively to exhort the Federal Circuit to remove patent cases from juries. 520 U.S.
at 39 n.8.
292
The importance of Federal Circuit decision making is a factor of both (a) the
increasing significance of legal determinations in patent cases, thus resulting in greater
reviewability of appellate judgments, see, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. Fas Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
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was “unworkable”—and replacing it with the crystal-clear “complete
bar” rule—was tantamount to the Federal Circuit announcing that it
was getting out of the business of deciding the scope of prosecution
293
Given the recent history of this court, the move
history estoppel.
away from unfettered judicial determinations (and thus unfettered
Federal Circuit determinations) is a remarkable step that suggests that
the court was quite serious about the problems with the flexible bar
status quo.
When the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is considered
in the context of its dual roles in the patent administration system—
providing information and creating incentives—the importance of the
strong form of the rule is clear. As a tool for patent reform—a rule
instead of a standard, and supported by the experience of a majority
of the Federal Circuit—the strong form of prosecution history estoppel dominates the weaker, more flexible forms. And yet the Supreme
Court’s Festo VII decision reimposed a widely flexible standard for the
294
application of prosecution history estoppel. Accordingly, the following Part concludes the Article with a brief look ahead, evaluating the
range of options for addressing the failure of the Festo decisions to
recognize the importance of prosecution history estoppel.

1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that claim construction is an entirely legal issue and no
deference is to be given to district courts), and (b) the Federal Circuit’s fondness for
complex “totality of the circumstances”-type tests, which lend little guidance to the district courts (and thus devalue their decision making), see, e.g., Litton Sys. v Honeywell
Inc., 140 F.3d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (outlining the pre-Festo VI multi-factor test for
prosecution history estoppel). See also Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1072 n.100
(noting the trend “in patent law towards greater decision-making by judges”); William
C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit’s Discomfort
with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 725 (2000) (identifying the tendency of
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to expand its traditional role to include factfinding).
293
Conigliaro, Greenberg, and Lemley suggest, without elaboration, that the
strong form of prosecution history estoppel would shift resolution of patent cases from
juries to judges. Conigliaro et al., supra note 8, at 1072. But the issue of prosecution
history estoppel (and its scope) was always one of law, Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39
n.8, so the change in forms would not have any direct impact. Perhaps the reduction
in the number of cases involving the doctrine of equivalents would decrease the jury’s
role. But see supra note 292 (noting small numbers of affected cases). However, it
seems as likely that the clarity of the strong form of estoppel would decrease, not increase, the importance of judicial decision making: because the parties (and district
courts) can easily determine the existence and scope of estoppel, there is correspondingly less room for judicial decision making.
294
See 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1841 (2002) (rejecting the absolute bar standard adopted
by the Federal Circuit); see also supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (describing
the Court’s rule).
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V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND FESTO
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. marked a profoundly disappointing conclusion to a
significant jurisprudential endeavor to reform the patent administra295
tive system. As noted above, the effort collapsed under the weight of
the narrow, wooden, and ultimately incorrect equivalents-centered
296
view of prosecution history estoppel. And yet this Article concludes
on a hopeful note, offering two observations. The first is that the
Federal Circuit, by virtue of the flexibility in the Supreme Court’s Festo
VII rule, has an opportunity to strengthen the form of prosecution history estoppel, thus reaping at least some of the benefits described
297
The second is that despite the failure of the Festo courts to
above.
recognize the importance of prosecution history estoppel in creating
ex ante effects, the analytic path followed by this Article—a shift from
ex post to ex ante analysis—is both generalizable to other aspects of
the patent law and likely to be beneficial.
A. Tweaking the Presumptive Bar: Strategies for the Federal Circuit
Although the Court in Festo VII imposed a weak form of prosecution history estoppel—a version of the flexible bar rule that I have described as the “presumptive bar”—there remains some opportunity for
the Federal Circuit to fill the doctrinal gaps in ways that support a
theory of prosecution history estoppel that reflects the doctrine’s dual
roles in information production and incentive creation. Indeed, it is
the very flexibility of the Festo VII flexible bar rule that provides a
range of discretion to that court, and the opportunity to move prosecution history estoppel in the right direction, if not all the way.
Strengthen the Presumption. The first insight from the analysis in this
298
Article is the importance of a strong form of estoppel. The possibility of patent scope reduction generates powerful incentives for patentees to act in socially beneficial ways or at least to internalize the
costs of their activities to some degree. While the Festo VII opinion
299
precludes the direct use of a strong form of estoppel, it is ambigu295

122 S. Ct. at 1841.
See supra Part I (exploring the incompleteness of the current equivalentscentered view of prosecution history estoppel).
297
See supra Part IV (noting advantages of the strong form of the rule).
298
See supra Parts III-IV (advocating the use of a strong form of estoppel).
299
See Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1841 (“[T]here is no more reason for holding the patentee to the literal terms of an amended claim than there is for abolishing the doc296
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ous, as noted above, concerning the strength of the presumption that
300
A
an amendment eliminates access to the doctrine of equivalents.
stronger presumption—that is, a more vigorous evidentiary hurdle for
the patentee—will result in more cases in which equivalents are
barred and thus generate greater ex ante incentives of the beneficial
nature described above. Thus, the Federal Circuit should take the
opportunity to clarify the strength and scope of the Festo VII presumption, and in doing so should strengthen it as much as possible.
Reduce the Loopholes. In noting that the presumptive bar could be
overcome if the elimination of equivalents was not “reasonable,” the
Supreme Court offered three examples of cases that should be
301
deemed unreasonable. Of relevance here is the third “catch-all” example: “[S]ome other reason suggesting that the patentee could not
reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute
302
in question.” The Federal Circuit should move with dispatch to clarify that the “some other reason” phraseology is quite limited, either by
suggesting a limited set of reasons itself or by noting that the addition
of reasons to sidestep the presumptive bar requires powerful evidence
that doing otherwise would be unreasonable. Doing so would effectively strengthen the form of the estoppel rule, by restricting the cases
303
that would avoid the effect of estoppel.
Impose Clarity. Finally, the Federal Circuit should avoid repeating
the mistakes of the pre-Festo prosecution history estoppel rules, which
a majority of the court described as rendering it virtually impossible to
ex ante predict the outcome of any given case. As noted in Part IV

trine of equivalents altogether and holding every patentee to the literal terms of the
patent.”).
300
See id. at 1834 (discussing the presumption that a decision to narrow claims
through amendment is a “general disclaimer of the territory between the original
claim and the amended claim”).
301
Id.; see also supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text (discussing the examples).
302
Festo VII, 122 S. Ct. at 1842.
303
And failing to do so could result in the dramatic watering-down of the presumption so as to render it meaningless. For example, the Court in Festo VII noted the
inherent difficulties in language-based descriptions of inventions. See id. at 1837
(“[T]he nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a
patent application.”); see also Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (“Often [an] invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it.”).
Under a permissive application of the “some other reason . . . that the patentee could
not reasonably be expected to have described the equivalent in question,” Festo VII, 122
S. Ct. at 1842, framework, that “the nature of language makes it impossible to capture
the essence of a thing in a patent application,” id. at 1837, could be viewed as enough
to overcome the presumption—thus vitiating the presumption altogether.
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above, the implementation of a rule rather than a standard in this
context is likely to be beneficial. Further, the court should recall that
it was largely the widespread dissatisfaction with the unconstrained
and unpredictable forms of analysis allowed under the pre-Festo regime that prompted the most recent efforts. Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit should take the opportunity to clarify aspects of the Festo VII
analysis as much as possible, such as the quantum of evidence required to overcome the presumption, what constitutes “some other
reason,” and more. To the extent possible, the court should impose
on itself analytic guidelines in an attempt to avoid the slide into a “totality of the circumstances” form of analysis.
In view of the three observations noted above, it seems clear that
the Federal Circuit has a brief window of opportunity to take important steps beneficially to affect the patent administration system. Although the Supreme Court in Festo VII inadequately considered the
true significance of prosecution history estoppel, the jurisprudential
discretion granted to the Federal Circuit offers a glimmer of hope that
at least some reform may yet be realized.
B. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post: Innovating the Patent Law
Absent doctrinal developments at the Federal Circuit bordering
on judicial disobedience, the Festo cases have failed in their role as a
vehicle for significant patent reform. Thus, given the circumstances,
it seems unlikely that the courts will recognize the inadequacies of the
equivalents-centered approach to prosecution history estoppel in favor of the broader theory set forth in this Article anytime soon. And
yet the analytic framework here is, I think, significant in its own right
and suggests further avenues of scholarly inquiry.
Stepping back, the basic move in the reconsideration of estoppel
developed above is the shift in focus from the ex post aspects of the
304
That is, the equivalentsdoctrine to the rule’s ex ante effects.
centered view critiqued above is classically an ex post analysis that is
concerned with the appropriate allocation of liability in a world where
the basic circumstances have been established, although the precise
304

Professor Bebchuk has recently made important contributions to the understanding of the ex ante/ex post analytic distinction. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property
Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001)
[hereinafter Bebchuck, Property Rights and Liability Rules] (describing the importance of
ex ante evaluations of entitlements); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Ex Ante Investments and Ex Post Externalities (Dec. 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (formalizing
the model), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=297091.
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305

boundaries may be somewhat indistinct. In the prosecution history
estoppel context, the ex post view (e.g., the equivalents-centered view)
asks whether the patent language in question, given certain amendments or clarifications during prosecution, should nonetheless be ex306
By contended to capture an allegedly-equivalent accused device.
trast, an ex ante theory of prosecution history estoppel analyzes the
effects on prosecution (and pre-prosecution) behavior that the alloca307
tion of liability will yield.
The importance of this general insight is twofold. The first is the
recognition that the ex ante effects of a given decision concerning liability will have efficiency implications; thus, considering only the ex
308
post results is analytically incomplete. Second, in a world where the
determination of liability ex post is costly (and/or prone to error), the
ex ante effects of a legal rule become highly important—either because they in large measure determine the allocation of liability, or
because the inefficiencies related to ex ante analysis are significant.
Here, as noted above, the informational challenges associated with
evaluating the patentability and scope of a patent—particularly during
litigation—are so pervasive as to command consideration of the incen309
tives surrounding prosecution (and pre-prosecution). Thus, the ex
ante-based theory of prosecution history estoppel developed above is
advantageous over that focused on ex post allocations of liability.
In the patent context, featuring significant informational challenges and costly ex post determinations of liability, a focus on the ex
ante effects of any particular legal rule seems especially appropriate.
Thus, the analytic framework developed in this Article is generalizable
across the patent law. This insight suggests that other legal rules in
the patent law are likely to be amenable to renewed ex ante considera310
tion. Take claim construction, for example: an ex ante approach
would evaluate the choice of legal doctrines for claim construction ac-

305

See, e.g., Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules, supra note 304, at 602-03
(describing ex post analyses).
306
See supra Part I (discussing the equivalents-centered analysis).
307
See Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules, supra note 304, at 603-04 (describing ex ante analyses).
308
See id. at 604 (“Different divisions of ex post value lead to different ex ante actions and investments. As a result, a given rule’s effects on the ex post division of the
total pie have an important effect on the overall ex ante efficiency of the rule.”).
309
See supra Parts II-III (addressing the failures of the equivalents-centered view
and advocating the adoption of a strong form of prosecution history estoppel).
310
“Claim construction” is the determination of the meaning of disputed claim
terms.
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cording to effects on claim drafting. This might suggest that a rule assigning the default meaning of claim terms according to a standard
311
312
dictionary would be beneficial, even though the ex post effects
313
314
might be less clear.
Other patent doctrines, such as obviousness
315
or even the doctrine of equivalents, might be similarly amenable to
ex ante-based analyses.
The intuition here, I suggest, is that a systematic reevaluation of
patent doctrines according to their ex ante effects is likely to yield new
approaches to staid jurisprudential features of the patent law. And
316
given the ever-increasing complexity of the patent system, the continued rapid growth rate of patent applications, and mounting criticism of patent administration, such an innovation would seem to offer
a better “payoff” (in terms of reform) than simply rehashing existing
debates concerning the ex post allocation of patent rights. Therefore,
by clearly establishing the advantages of ex ante forms of analysis (and
the weaknesses of traditional views), the missed opportunity for meaningful reform represented by the Festo decisions is perhaps better
viewed as only the beginning of reform efforts—rather than the end.

311

Perhaps the PTO could promulgate an “official” list of standard reference
sources, related to technological field where appropriate. Claim terms would then be
presumed to take the meaning assigned in the standard source, unless the patentee
clearly designated a different meaning.
312
Beneficial in the sense that it would induce patentees to be clear about the
meanings of the words they choose for the claims.
313
The primary objection would be that dictionary definitions are poor substitutes
for more contextual determinations of meaning. Cf., e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v.
United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“The dictionary does not always keep
abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words, but
words for things.”).
314
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
315
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21
(1997) (describing in detail the doctrine of equivalents).
316
See, e.g., John Allison & Mark Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the U.S. Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2001) (evaluating the increasing complexity of the patent
law empirically).

